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Last Term:
Guy MITCHELL et a.
V.
Mary L. HELMS et al.
No. 98-1648
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 28, 2000
THE LOUISIANA CASE: JUSTICES APPROVE U.S. FINANCING
OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS' EQUIPMENT
The New York Times
Thursday, June 29,2000
Linda Greenhouse
Overturning two of its own precedents that
had limited public aid to religious schools, the
Supreme Court ruled today that a federal
program that placed computers and other
"instructional equipment" in parochial school
classrooms did not violate the constitutional
separation between church and state.
The 6-to-3 decision was not supported by a
single majority opinion.
A far-reaching opinion by Justice Clarence
Thomas that would have made "the principles
of neutrality and private choice" the only
touchstones for channeling aid to religious
schools was supported by three other justices.
But Justice Thomas's opinion was qualified
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's insistence in
a concurring opinion that public aid may
supplement, but must not supplant, money that
a religious school could otherwise spend on its
own programs.
Nonetheless, the decision appeared likely to
provide momentum for the drive to legalize the
use of vouchers for religious-school tuition and
provide ammunition for the legal argument that
as long as aid was distributed evenhandedly, it
could not be said to be impermissibly favoring
religious recipients.
"We see six potential votes for school
choice," Clint Bolick, litigation director of the
Institute for Justice, a leading advocacy group
on the issue, said today. His count included
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who voted with
Justice O'Connor, as well as the three who
voted with Justice Thomas: Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin
Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.
Nonetheless, although the voucher debate
was obviously in the justices' minds, that
outcome remained in the realm of potential,
given Justice O'Connor's observation that in
the case before the court today, no government
funds "ever reach the coffers of a religious
school."
The Rev. Barry Lynn, director of Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State,
said in an interview that "in the case of
vouchers, the money goes directly to the
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school's coffers" even though it first passed
through the hands of parents. "The parents can
do nothing with the voucher except spend it for
tuition," Mr. Lynn said.
The Clinton administration supported the
program that was upheld today and appealed a
decision from a federal appeals court in New
Orleans that declared it unconstitutional.
Dating to 1965, the law, now known generally
as Chapter 2, has evolved from providing video
filmstrips and similar material to a vehicle for
accomplishing the administration's goal of
wiring every classroom in the country for
Internet access.
Under the program, federal money flows
through public school districts, which are
obligated to buy the equipment and distribute
it, technically as loans, to all schools within the
district's geographic boundaries -- public,
private and parochial -- based on their
enrollment. Three taxpayers in Jefferson Parish,
La., brought suit in 1985 to challenge the
program's application to religious schools in the
district on the ground that there was no way of
preventing the schools from using the
equipment in support of their religious mission.
The case had a tangled history, leading
eventually to a 1998 ruling by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New
Orleans, that the program was unconstitutional
under two Supreme Court precedents from the
mid-1970's. Those decisions, Meek v. Pittenger
and Wolman v. Walter, held that the
government could provide textbooks but not
other instructional materials to religious
schools, the premise being that textbooks could
be vetted in advance to make sure they did not
advance the schools' religious mission.
The six justices who voted in the majority
today to overturn the Fifth Circuit's decision all
agreed that the earlier decisions should be
overruled. Justice Thomas said the decisions
were "irreconcilable" with other decisions in
this area that came both before and after them,
most recently the court's ruling three years ago
in Agostini v. Felton. In that decision -- which
also overturned a precedent -- the court held
that it did not violate the Constitution for
public schools to send teachers into parochial
schools, under a federal program, to provide
remedial classes.
As these decisions indicate, the court's
jurisprudence on the subject of permissible
public aid to religious schools has been in
turmoil for years. The case today, Mitchell v.
Helms, No. 98-1648, was the oldest on the
court's docket, having been argued on Dec. 1,
and the justices' failure to settle on a single
majority opinion after seven months showed
that the turmoil was likely to continue.
Reflecting on historical anti-Catholic
sentiment in the late 1800's, Justice Thomas
said that "hostility to aid to pervasively
sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that
we do not hesitate to disavow." He said that
"nothing in the Establishment Clause requires
the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools
from otherwise permissible aid programs," and
that the cases that supported such exclusion,
"born of bigotry, should be buried now."
He said that government programs should
be upheld on "the principles of neutrality and
private choice," meaning that if the government
"offers aid on the same terms, without regard
to religion," no impermissible religious purpose
could be attributed to the government. That
was especially true, he said, when individuals
could make their own private choices on how
to use the aid.
It was at this point that Justice O'Connor
and Justice Breyer expressed their unease with
what Justice O'Connor called the "logic" of
Justice Thomas's opinion.
"The plurality opinion foreshadows the
approval of direct monetary subsidies to
religious organizations, even when they use the
money to advance their religious objectives,"
Justice O'Connor said.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice David H.
Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said Justice
Thomas's opinion represented a fundamental
break with the court's precedents. Justice Souter
said Justice Thomas's opinion threatened the
court's long-held distinction "between indirect
aid that reaches religious schools only
incidentally as a result of numerous individual
choices and aid that is in reality directed to
religious schools by the government or in
practical terms selected by religious schools
themselves."
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring
opinion, explained her reasons for agreeing that
the court should overturn the precedents that
limited aid to providing textbooks.
"Technology's advance," she said, has made
the distinction between textbooks and other
materials "more suspect" than ever.
"Computers are now as necessary as were
schoolbooks 30 years ago, and they play a
somewhat similar role in the educational
process," she said.
Copyright Q 2000 The New York Times
Company
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HIGH COURT OKS TAXPAYER AID FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Jeff Plaintiffs Lose 15-Year Battle
The Tines-Picayune
Thursday, June 29, 2000
Bruce Alpert and Mark Wailer
In a major victory for religious schools, the
U.S. Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled in a
Jefferson Parish case that taxpayer money can
be used to provide their students with
computers and other instructional material.
The 6-3 ruling sent a mixed signal about
how the court might react to cases litigating the
politically charged issue of vouchers, taxpayer-
financed tuition assistance for religious schools.
Four justices joined the majority opinion
that seemed to argue in favor of almost any
government aid to religious schools, as long as
similar assistance is provided to non-religious
schools. Two justices who helped form the six-
vote majority in the Jefferson Parish case wrote
in a separate opinion that they don't accept the
"unprecedented breadth" of the opinion by
their four colleagues.
"It means that the issue of vouchers hasn't
been resolved by this ruling," said Thomas Berg
of Samford University Law School in
Birmingham, Ala.
But on the issue of computers and similar
assistance to religious schools, the court issued
a clear-cut victory for the schools and for the
Clinton administration. President Clinton,
through the Justice Department, intervened in
the case, arguing that a negative ruling would
have scuttled his plan to connect every school,
public and private, to the Internet.
Religious use irrelevant
Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence
Thomas said it does not matter, as the Jefferson
Parish parents who challenged the aid had
maintained, if the computers and equipment
provided by taxpayer financing are put to
religious use.
"So long as the governmental aid is not
itself unsuitable for use in the public schools
because of religious content, and eligibility for
aid is determined in a constitutionally
permissible manner, any use of that aid to
indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the
government and is thus not of constitutional
concern," Thomas wrote.
The plaintiffs in the 15-year old case,
Jefferson Parish parents Neva Helms and Marie
Schneider, argued that computers could easily
be used for religious purposes, unlike textbooks
and buses, which the high court previously said
were permissible for use by religious schools.
But Thomas said, "government-provided
lecterns, chalk, crayons, pens, paper and paint
brushes," also could be used for religious
purposes, and that shouldn't be a problem.
"In fact, the risk of improper attribution is
less when the aid lacks content, for there is no
risk (as there is with books), of the government
inadvertently providing improper content,"
Thomas wrote.
After getting news of the decision
Wednesday, Helms said public schools will be
damaged by a widening of opportunities for
taxpayer money to go toward enhancements at
religious schools.
"It breaks my heart for public schools," she
said. "I think it's a nail in the coffin of public
schools."
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A matter of sharing
The decision resolves a lengthy legal fight
that centered on the federal Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, which gives
public school districts money for special
services and instructional equipment and
requires them to share the equipment in a
"secular, neutral and nonideological" manner
with private schools.
Thomas said that in Jefferson Parish, about
46 private schools participate in the federal
program, and receive about 30 percent of the
federal aid under the education act allocated to
the parish. Thirty-four of the schools are
Roman Catholic, seven are affiliated with other
religions, and five are not affiliated with a
religion.
After a ruling by the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals that computers and similar equipment
could not be provided to religious schools,
seven parents of students at Jefferson Parish
parochial schools appealed to the Supreme
Court, prompting Wednesday's decision.
Helms, 57, said she fears the channeling of
public money to private schools, which could
enable religious schools to keep tuition down,
could lead to public schools serving mostly as
last resorts for disadvantaged, disenfranchised
and disabled children.
"If you're not white and rich, you're going
to be in a public school," she said.
Helms said she did not expect a sweeping
victory, "especially since you have justices that
are Catholic."
"But I feel honored that I got this far," she
said. "I don't feel like we lost. People are more
sensitive to church and state issues now. I made
people aware."
Risk of secularization
Schneider, after hearing about the court's
decision, said, "It's a disappointment, but not a
surprise. I accept the decision because this is
the Supreme Court and I have gone as far as I
can. ... I have never regretted that I took the
journey. I did it for public school children who
I feel were discriminated against."
Schneider, 71, who describes herself as
"thoroughly" Catholic, said she also is troubled
by another aspect of public financial support
for religious schools: "Seldom does government
aid come without strings, regulations. And
when more government aid comes to religious
schools, religious schools become secularized."
"Religious schools think they've won, but in
the long-run, they've really lost. I hope
someone will pick up the torch from this old
lady and fight for religious freedom."
Another appeal
Attorneys for the seven parents who
intervened in the case on behalf of the public
support for their schools said they celebrated
Wednesday at the close of a "career case."
"This really preserves the status quo," said
Patricia Dean of the Washington, D.C., law
firm Arnold & Porter. "It lets the federal
government continue to make education a
priority."
"This decision is not hostile to people who
choose to send their children to private or
religious schools," Dean said. "It does away
with the subtle hostility."
The court is to decide today on whether it
will take up an appeal by Helms and Schneider
challenging another 5th Circuit ruling that
special education assistance to parochial
schools is permissible.
In his decision, Thomas, a Roman Catholic,
wrote that "hostility to the Catholic Church and
to Catholics in general" was at least in part
behind historic opposition of aid to non-secular
schools and represents "a shameful pedigree
that we do not hesitate to disavow."
Thomas, in his opinion, appears to be
advocating for sustaining much more than the
computers and other equipment at issue in the
Jefferson Parish case. Many legal experts read
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his opinion, in which Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Anthony Kennedy concurred, as an
endorsement of vouchers.
"If the religious, irreligious and areligious
are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no
one would conclude that any indoctrination
that any particular recipient conducts has been
done at the behest of the government,"
-Thomas wrote.
The key player
But Berg, who writes regularly on church
and state issues, said it is clear that Thomas
doesn't yet have a fifth vote for his view, and
that lower courts no doubt will heed the
separate opinion written by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor on behalf of herself and Justice
Stephen Breyer when considering voucher
cases.
In her opinion, O'Connor calls the
"expansive scope" of Thomas' ruling
"troubling." O'Connor also makes
pronouncements that will give both supporters
and opponents of vouchers reason to be
concerned.
For example, she says that she disagrees
with Thomas that as long as the government is
neutral in handing out aid, it can be used for
religious purposes.
But she also states that it is important that
aid be provided directly to the individual
student who, in turn, "made the choice of
where to put that aid to use," which proponents
say is exactly the concept behind vouchers.
Robert O'Neil, a constitutional law
professor at the University of Virginia, said that
in future voucher cases O'Connor will be the
key player, just as in previous questions of aid
to religious schools.
"It will be pretty much a case of what (is
permissible) will be what Justice O'Connor says
it is," O'Neil said.
Justices David H. Souter, John Paul Stevens
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented from the
majority decision in the Jefferson Parish case.
In his dissent, Souter said the majority is
wrong to suggest that simply making aid
available to religious and non-religious groups
is enough to demonstrate that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the Constitution is not being violated. The
clause states: "Congress shall make no laws
respecting an establishment of religion."
"If we looked no further than
evenhandedness and failed to ask what activities
the aid might support, or in fact did support,
religious schools could be blessed with
government funding as massive as expenditures
made for the benefit of their public school
counterparts," Souter wrote.
Diverse reactions
Reaction was mixed, reflecting the
complexity and widely differing opinions over
the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Archbishop Francis Schulte, in a statement
Wednesday, said he was "elated" by the court's
opinon.
"This decision brightens our educational
future," Schulte said. "I am thankful because
the decision should support the extension of
new educational technologies to all children
regardless of the schools they attend.
Educational aid to religious schools does not
violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. It simply allows families to make
the best educational choices for their children."
At St. Francis Xavier Cabrini School, a pre-
kindergarten through eighth-grade school in
New Orleans, principal Suzette Cochiara said
the school receives computers through a state
program and library books and films through
the federal program that the Supreme Court
affirmed.
Cochiara said the materials are marked with
tags indicating they were paid for with public
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money so teachers will not use them for
religious instruction. "We don't want to
endanger those funds," she said.
Rabbi David Saperstein, director of the
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism in
Washington, D.C., said the decision represents
a setback to those who believe that religious
schools ought to be supported by parents who
decide to send their children there, not by the
taxpayers.
"We are disappointed to see today a brick
knocked out of the wall of separation between
church and state, but we remain grateful for the
protection that wall continues to provide for
religious liberty," said Saperstein, who believes
there is still a majority of the high court
opposed to vouchers.
But the Rev. Bob Schenck, president of the
National Clergy Council, said the high court on
Wednesday recognized that religious schools
can make a positive contribution and that
assistance from taxpayers doesn't represent
government endorsement of any particular
religion.
"For too long there has been a near-
maniacal paranoia over the participation of
religious groups in American public life,"
Shanks said. "The fact is that religious people
and institutions are good for society and
especially good for education, and the court has
seen that truth today."
Copyright C 2000 The Times-Picayune
Publishing Co.
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Last Term:
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA and Monmouth Council, et al.
V.
James DALE
No. 99-699
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 28, 2000
BOY SCOUTS' BAN ON GAY LEADERS UPHELD BY COURT
5-4 RULING RESPECTS GROUP'S 'SINCERITY'
The Baltimore Sun
Thursday, June 29, 2000
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON - Allowing homosexuals
to be shut out of one of America's most
revered institutions, the Boy Scouts of America,
a divided Supreme Court barred states
yesterday from forcing Scout troops to accept
gays as scoutmasters.
The mere presence of an openly gay
person as an adult Scout leader, the court
declared in its 5-4 ruling, would contradict the
Scouts' own "sincere" belief that homosexuality
is immoral and "unclean."
In the most significant gay rights case the
court has considered in four years, the justices
issued a fairly narrow decision confined to the
Scouting policy against homosexuals.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's spare,
19-page opinion for the majority said nothing
specific about other state and local laws that
seek to protect access for gays and lesbians to
jobs, housing and other pnvate opportumtles.
But the opinion did include some language
that seemed to question the use of state "public
accommodation laws" to control access to
private groups, instead of limiting those laws to
guaranteeing access to such public places as
restaurants and hotels.
Although the decision was confined to the
Scouts' policy of eKcluding homosexuals from
leadership posts, some of the language in the
opinion was broad enough to permit the
organization to keep out gay boys as members.
The 6.2-million member organization does
not have separate bans on gay leaders and gay
youth members. Its policy, quoted by the court
yesterday, says simply: "We do not allow for the
registration of avowed homosexuals as
members or as leaders of the BSA."
Rehnquist's opinion contained no moral
judgments against homosexuality and, in fact,
said that "it appears that homosexuality has
gained greater societal acceptance." And he was
careful to note that the justices were not ruling
on whether the Scouts' beliefs on the subject
were right or wrong.
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The ruling was a defeat for a former Eagle
Scout in New Jersey, James Dale, who now
lives in New York. He had fought in New
Jersey courts to overturn his exclusion as an
assistant scoutmaster, after the Scouting
organization learned from a newspaper article
that he was gay.
He won in the New Jersey Supreme Court,
under a state public accommodations law. But
the justices took away his victory.
Dale said he was "definitely saddened by
the decision."
"People don't join the Boy Scouts because
they're anti-gay," he said. "People join the Boy
Scouts because they want acceptance, they want
community."
A spokesman for the Scouts, Gregg
Shields, commented: "We're very pleased. It's
going to allow us to continue our mission of
providing character-building programs for
youth."
President Clinton, whose office makes him
honorary president of the Scouts, repeated his
opposition to discrimination against gays, but
did not condemn the Scouts.
"They're a great group," he told reporters.
"They do a lot of good. And I would hope that
... this is just one step along the way of a
movement toward greater inclusion for our
society, because I think that's the direction we
ought to be going in."
Within the Scouting movement itself, there
appears to be the some effort to get national
leaders to reconsider the gay ban.
At least two regional Scout councils have
called for a review.
In addition, some religious groups that
sponsor Scout troops have said the policy
should be changed.
The Girl Scouts do not ban lesbians from
membership or adult leadership posts.
Matt Coles, director of the American Civil
Liberties Union's project on lesbian and gay
rights, called the ruling "damaging but limited."
"It will not reach very far beyond groups
like the Boy Scouts," he said, adding: "Anti-gay
groups did not get the 'free pass' they were
looking for to dismantle civil rights laws that
provide equal protection to lesbians and gay
men.
'Important victory'
But Vincent P. McCarthy, a senior counsel
for the American Center for Law and Justice, a
conservative legal advocacy group, called the
decision "an important victory, not only for the
Boy Scouts but for all private organizations."
He said the court " reaffirmed the rights of
private organizations to define their own
criteria for leadership."
"The decision will have a dramatic impact
on all private organizations as they define their
own mission," he said.
Rehnquist's opinion was limited to the
history of Dale's case, the background of the
Scouting policy against gays and a recitation of
a few basic principles about private groups'
constitutional right to come together and share
common views.
Showing strong respect for the
organization, the chief justice did not question
the Scouts' claim that they believe sincerely that
"homosexual conduct is not morally straight"
and their policy against promoting"
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior."
It was not for the courts, Rehnquist said,
to reject a group's "expressed values." He said
the policy has been followed at least since 1978,
before Dale became an assistant scoutmaster in
a Matawan, N.J., troop.
If the Scouts now had to take Dale back as
a leader, the opinion said, that "would, at the
very least, force the organization to send a
message, both to the youth members and the
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world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
Dissenting opinion
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissenting
opinion, denounced the decision. Stevens said it
was based not on any conclusion that Dale
would himself advocate homosexuality within
Scouting, but solely on his status as an avowed
homosexual.
Joining Stevens in dissent were Justices
Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
David H. Souter.
The dissenters lambasted the Scouts'
policy, saying it was "the product of a habitual
way of thinking about strangers."
Rehnquist's majority included Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Copyright C 2000 The Baltimore Sun
Company
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THE SUPREME COURT: THE NEW JERSEY CASE
Supreme Court Backs Boy Scouts In Ban of Gays From Membership
The New York Times
Thurs day, June 29, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled today by a 5-to-4
vote that the Boy Scouts have a constitutional
right to exclude gay members because
opposition to homosexuality is part of the
organization's "expressive message."
The decision overturned a ruling last year
by the New Jersey Supreme Court that applied
the state's law against discrimination in public
accommodations to require a New Jersey troop
to readmit a longtime member and assistant
scoutmaster, James Dale, whom it had
dismissed after learning he was gay.
Writing for the court today, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist said that the court
intended neither to approve nor disapprove the
Boy Scouts' view of homosexuality, but that the
First Amendment's protection for freedom of
association meant that the state could not
compel the 6.2-million member organization
"to accept members where such acceptance
would derogate from the organization's
expressive message."
He said "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts
would, at the very least, force the organization
to send a message, both to the youth members
and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior."
The four dissenters did not object to the
general principle that an organization cannot be
forced to adopt or incorporate an unwanted
message -- a principle the court applied
unanimously five years ago in upholding the
right of the Boston St. Patrick's Day parade
organizers to exclude a group that sought to
march under a banner of Irish gay pride.
But the dissenters objected strenuously to
that principle's application in this case, because
they said the majority had done little more than
accept at face value the Boy Scouts' assertion of
the central importance of their opposition to
homosexuality. But except in briefs filed in
cases defending their membership policy, the
Boy Scouts had never made the "clear,
unequivocal statement necessary to prevail" on
a claim that homosexuality was fundamentally
incompatible with the organization's mission,
the dissenters said.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens
filed the main dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G.
Breyer and David H. Souter, who also filed a
dissenting opinion.
In permitting the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment interests to trump New Jersey's
antidiscrimination law, the majority relied
heavily on its 1995 St. Patrick's Day parade
case, in which the gay marchers had claimed the
protection of a Massachusetts civil rights law.
That decision and the ruling today indicated
that the court would continue to weigh on a
case-by-case basis the competing claims of a
private group's right to exclude unwanted
participation and a public policy against
discrimination.
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The majority today drew a distinction
between this decision and a trio of Supreme
Court rulings from the 1980's rejecting the
arguments of all-male organizations, including
the Rotary Club, that they had a First
Amendment right to exclude women.
The court held in those cases that because
the exclusion of women was not part of the
shared goal or expressive message of those
organizations, the application of state civil
rights laws to require the admission of women
did not place an unconstitutional burden on the
members' right of association.
While none of the court's free association
cases have dealt with exclusion by private
organizations on the basis of race, that analysis
would presumably permit a white supremacy
group to exclude blacks if racial exclusion was
an inherent part of the group's identity and
message.
In his opinion, Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, No. 99-699, the chief justice quoted from
various Boy Scouts publications and
explanations of the policy, noting that though
the terms "morally straight" and "clean" in the
Scout Oath and Law "are by no means self-
defining," Scout officials interpreted them as
statements of opposition to homosexuality.
Ruth Harlow, deputy legal director of the
Lambda Legal Defense Fund in New York, said
today that the Boy Scouts had won only a
"hollow, Pyrrhic victory" because to win the
case, it had to demonstrate to the court's
satisfaction the centrality of its opposition to
homosexuality. "The Boy Scouts have fought
long and hard for something that has
marginalized their institution," she said.
Evan Wolfson, another lawyer with the
Lambda organization, who represented Mr.
Dale before the court, said the decision
"requires you to declare yourself an institution
with an anti-gay message, and we don't think
there are many organizations in this day and age
willing to declare themselves as that."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
noted several newspaper articles from the last
few weeks that described a gay pride day at the
Central Intelligence Agency, a New England
boarding school's acceptance of openly gay
couples as dormitory parents and the extension
of benefits to gay partners by the major
automobile makers. "The past month alone has
witnessed some remarkable changes in attitudes
about homosexuals," he said.
Chief Justice Rehnquist responded:
"Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has
gained greater societal acceptance. But this is
scarcely an argument for denying First
Amendment protection to those who refuse to
accept these views."
In a statement on its Web site, the Boy
Scouts said that as a private organization, the
Scouts "must have the right to establish its own
standards of membership if it is to continue to
instill the values of the Scout oath and law in
boys." The statement continued: "Thanks to
our legal victories, our standards of
membership have been sustained. We believe
an avowed homosexual is not a role model for
the values espoused in the Scout oath and law."
Drawing on the distinctions between this
case and the earlier rulings on all-male clubs,
the chief justice said that, to claim the First
Amendment's protection, "a group must engage
in some form of expression, whether it be
public or private."
Justice Stevens said in dissent that the
majority's distinction was unpersuasive because
just as the all-male clubs had not made the
exclusion of women a central goal, "there is no
shared goal or collective effort to foster a belief
about homosexuality" in the Boy Scouts, "let
alone one that is significantly burdened by
admitting homosexuals."
Justice Stevens said: "The only apparent
explanation for the majority's holding, then, is
that homosexuals are simply so different from
the rest of society that their presence alone --
unlike any other individual's -- should be
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singled out for special First Amendment
treatment."
The civic and cultural standing of the Boy
Scouts, the "sincerity" of which the majority
opinion noted in several places, may have had
more to do with the outcome of the case than
Mr. Dale's sexual orientation.
The case attracted dozens of briefs, a
number depicting this legal battle -- which the
Boy Scouts have been waging in courts around
the country for 20 years -- as the cutting edge
of the current culture wars.
Mr. Dale was an Eagle Scout and popular
member and then assistant leader of the troop
he had joined at the age of 8 when, 12 years
later, he was ejected after his picture appeared
in a New Jersey newspaper article about a gay
student conference at Rutgers, where he was
co-president of the gay and lesbian students'
organization. He brought suit under a New
Jersey law that prohibits discrimination in
places of public accommodation.
Because the New Jersey Supreme Court
found as a matter of state law that the Boy
Scouts fit the definition of a public
accommodation, rather than a purely private
organization, that aspect of the case was not
open to the justices' re-examination.
Copyright Q 2000 The New York Times
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BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN System, et al.
V.
Scott Harold SOUTHWORTH, et al.
No. 98-1189
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided March 22, 2000
JUSTICES OK POLITICAL USES OF STUDENT FEES
Supreme Court: Panel Rejects Suit Brought by Conservatives Unhappy About Paying for
Liberal Causes
Los Angeles Times
Thursday, March 23,2000
David G. Savage
State colleges and universities can force
their students to subsidize activist groups on
campus, even when these organizations push
political causes that offend some students, the
Supreme Court ruled Wednesday.
In a 9-0 decision, the court rejected free-
speech claims by young conservatives at the
University of Wisconsin at Madison who
objected to supporting left-wing groups there.
They relied on the 1st Amendment
principle that no one should be forced to
endorse ideas or contribute to political causes
they oppose.
However, the justices said that the dissident
students are not required to endorse any ideas
or groups. Instead, they are forced to pay an
activity fee that creates a pool of money that in
turn supports campus groups.
All student organizations can seek school
funding, without regard to their political or
ideological views, the justices noted. This
system is "viewpoint neutral," they said, and
that is sufficient to protect the rights of all.
Wednesday's ruling preserves a funding
system that has grown at most large universities
over the last two decades. Campus groups have
flourished with the support of student fees.
University officials say that the mix of active
organizations enriches life on campus.
Many organizations offer support to groups
of students. For example, the Madison campus
has a women's center and a lesbian, gay, and
bisexual center with offices in the Student
Union.
But other groups are formed around causes
such as environmentalism or socialism. They
180
are explicitly ideological and, in some instances,
engage in lobbying and political activity.
Across the country, conservative students
have complained loudly about these left-leaning
activist groups. They have charged that the vast
majority of student funds goes to groups that
espouse liberal views.
In 1996, when the University of Wisconsin
was sued for its funding policy, the student
activity fee was $ 331. Wisconsin PIRG, a
liberal public interest group, received $ 50,000
in student funding that year. The conservative
Federalist Society received a $ 300 grant to
defray travel costs for speakers.
University officials said that this imbalance-
-if it is one--reflects the views and interests of
the students. They form the groups. They are
free to seek the subsidies. And a student board-
-Associated Students of Madison--allocates the
funds.
The court did not examine how the funding
system worked at Madison, accepting that
funding decisions were made without regard to
political views.
In the lower courts, conservative advocates
had won cases concerning involuntary funding
of groups or activities.
In 1993, the California Supreme Court
ruled that dissident students were entitled to
seek refunds for the part of their fees that
subsidized political groups. However, the
amount of any refund is typically small.
Earlier, the high court had ruled that
dissident schoolteachers could not be forced to
pay union dues that in turn are used for
political activity. In 1990, the justices said the
same about dissident lawyers in California who
objected to paying for lobbying by the state bar.
Relying on those precedents, a federal judge
and the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago sided
with the three conservative law students who
sued the University of Wisconsin.
But the justices reversed the ruling (Board
of Regents vs. Southworth, 98-1189).
"The 1st Amendment permits a public
university to charge its students an activity fee
used to fund a program to facilitate
extracurricular student speech if the program is
viewpoint neutral," said Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy for the court.
Unlike a labor union, where the members'
dues support a single viewpoint, a student's fees
support a variety of views, Kennedy explained.
Jordan Lorence, a Fairfax, Va., lawyer who
represented the plaintiffs, said he was surprised
and disappointed by the outcome.
The funding system "is not about
promoting diversity," he said. "It actually
reinforces the majority point of view on
campus."
Gay and lesbian students say they were the
targets of the conservative legal attacks.
"This was part of a well-funded, aggressive
campaign to 'defund the left,' " said Matt Coles,
director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project
for the American Civil Liberties Union. "These
conservative students were not being compelled
to support any particular viewpoint. They were
supporting a forum for students that is open to
all."
Wednesday's decision marks the second
time this year that the conservative-leaning
Supreme Court has rejected a free-speech claim
brought by conservatives.
In January, the justices upheld official
contribution limits for political candidates,
rejecting a free-speech claim championed by
the Republican National Committee. The
decision revived a $ 1,000 state limit for
candidates in Missouri; the six-vote majority
included Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
In both cases, Rehnquist and O'Connor
sided with the states--as they usually do--rather
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than take up the free-speech claim brought by
conservatives.
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NO STUDENT VETO FOR CAMPUS FEES
The New York Times
Thursday, March 23, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled today that public
universities can collect student activity fees
even from students who object to particular
activities, as long as the groups given the money
are chosen without regard to their views.
The 9-to-0 decision, in a case from the
University of Wisconsin, was a surprisingly
broad and decisive victory for universities on an
ideologically charged issue that has roiled
higher education.
Groups of students, usually identifying
themselves as conservatives, have claimed a
constitutional right to keep their money from
supporting gay rights, women's rights, the
environment and other causes.
Three law students at Wisconsin's Madison
campus brought the suit and won a ruling from
the federal appeals court in Chicago that the
mandatory fees were a form of compelled
speech that violated their First Amendment
rights.
The suit was financed by the Alliance
Defense Fund, an organization based in
Scottsdale, Ariz., that advises conservative
students on strategies for "defunding the left."
As it made its way through the courts, the
Wisconsin case became a rallying point for
conservative groups long resentful of the
dominance of liberal discourse on many
campuses, as well as a source of concern for
university administrators. The American
Council on Education, representing 1,800
public and private colleges and universities,
filed a brief supporting the University of
Wisconsin with the court.
In his opinion for the court today
overturning the appellate ruling, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that while the
students did have First Amendment interests at
stake, "recognition must be given as well to the
important and substantial purposes of the
university, which seek to facilitate a wide range
of speech."
"The speech the university seeks to
encourage in the program before us is
distinguished not by discernible limits but by its
vast, unexplored bounds," he wrote, adding:
"The university may determine that its
mission is well served if students have the
means to engage in dynamic discussions of
philosophical, religious, scientific, social and
political subjects in their extracurricular campus
life outside the lecture hall. If the university
reaches this conclusion, it is entitled to impose
a mandatory fee to sustain an open dialogue to
these ends."
The decision directly covers only public
colleges and universities, since the Constitution
applies only to government behavior. But the
court's statement might well guide the
resolution of similar debates over mandatory
student fees that have arisen on private
campuses.
Katharine Lyall, president of the University
of Wisconsin system, called the ruling "a
landmark decision for higher education in this
century." In an interview, Ms. Lyall said that the
decision's importance lay in its "ringing
endorsement of the idea that universities are
special places for the free exchange of ideas, no
matter how controversial."
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Justice Kennedy's opinion in the case,
Board of Regents v. Southworth, No. 98-1189,
was joined by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and by Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Justice David H. Souter filed a separate
concurring opinion that was also signed by
Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G.
Breyer. They said that because both sides in the
case, which was decided in the lower courts
without a trial, had stipulated to the "viewpoint
neutrality" of the process for allocating the
activity fees to student groups, the court should
simply have found the process constitutional
without having to "impose a cast-iron
viewpoint-neutrality requirement" as part of the
First Amendment analysis.
The concurring opinion also cautioned that
the requirement of neutrality did not apply to a
university's own speech, as exemplified by
curriculum choices. "The university need not
provide junior years abroad in North Korea as
well as France," Justice Souter wrote.
Only a small part of the fee was at issue in
the case. The bulk of the fee, which amounts to
several hundred dollars a year, goes to the
student health service, intramural sports, and
other noncontroversial uses.
About 20 percent of the total is distributed
among roughly 200 student groups; as Justice
Kennedy noted, they range from the Future
Financial Gurus of America to the International
Socialist Organization.
Groups that meet general guidelines seek
and receive reimbursement for expenses like
printing, postage and the use of university
facilities, with partisan political, religious or
lobbying activities ineligible for reimbursement.
Financing decisions are subject to review by the
university's chancellor and regents.
The court today found fault with one minor
aspect of the Wisconsin system: an alternative
method of obtaining financing, or of stripping
an organization of its financing, through a
student referendum.
Justice Kennedy found this process
constitutionally troublesome because it
provided insufficient protection for minority
viewpoints.
"The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality
is that minority views are treated with the same
respect as are majority views," he wrote.
With all justices agreeing on this point, the
court told the appeals court to examine the
referendum issue.
Matthew Coles, director of the lesbian and
gay rights project of the American Civil
Liberties Union, which filed a brief in the case,
said the ruling ensures that "the existence of
student organizations will not be subject to
majority whim."
Mr. Coles said gay rights groups were
almost always the targets of students who
sought to withhold part of their activity fees. In
this case, the plaintiffs objected to an abortion
rights program presented by the Campus
Women's Center, a gay film festival and a
conference sponsored by two gay rights groups.
In ruling for the objecting students, both
the Federal District Court in Madison and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit based their analysis on Supreme Court
precedents holding that lawyers who are
required to pay bar dues and nonunion workers
who must pay agency fees in lieu of union dues
have a constitutional right to withhold their
money from political activities to which they
object and that are not "germane" to the bar
association's or union's mission.
But Justice Kennedy said today that those
precedents were not applicable because "to
insist upon asking what speech is germane
would be contrary to the very goal the
University seeks to pursue."
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He added: "It is not for the court to say
what is or is not germane to the ideas to be
pursued in an institution of higher learning."
Rather, Justice Kennedy said, the case was
governed by a 1995 decision holding that a
public university did not violate the separation
of church and state by using student fees to
support a student religious publication on the
same basis as any other student publication.
Justice Kennedy wrote that opinion,
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia.
In a concurring opinion in the 1995 case,
Justice O'Connor raised the question of
whether objecting students might have a
constitutional right to withhold part of their
fees, a question she evidently found to have
been answered in the negative today.
Copyright © 2000 The New York Times
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Last Tenn:
SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
V.
Jane DOE, et al.
No. 99-62
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 19, 2000
THE SUPREME COURT: THE RELIGION ISSUE
Student Prayers Must Be be Private, Court Reaffirms
The New York Times
Tuesday, June 20,2000
Linda Greenhouse
Strongly reaffirming its earlier decisions
against officially sponsored prayer in public
schools, the Supreme Court ruled today that
prayers led by students at high school football
games are no exception: as officially sanctioned
acts at events that students feel great social
pressure to attend, they are unconstitutional.
The 6-to-3 majority opinion by Justice
John Paul Stevens said that even when
attendance was voluntary and when the
decision to pray was made by students, "the
delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper
effect of coercing those present to participate in
an act of religious worship." ***
The case came from a small school district
in South Texas, typical of communities across
the South where the practice of prayer at
graduations, assemblies and athletic contests
has persisted as officials have tried to navigate
the obstacle course created by Supreme Court
and lower court decisions.
In this case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans,
had ruled that students could offer prayers at
graduations -- where members of the clergy
cannot, under a 1992 Supreme Court decision -
- but not in the "far less solemn and
extraordinary" setting of a football game.
The decision today did not explicitly
address graduation ceremonies, but the
majority's analysis cast serious doubt on the
increasingly popular practice of student-led
graduation prayers. The justices have been
asked to hear a challenge to an Alabama law,
upheld last year by a federal appeals court, that
permits "student-initiated voluntary prayer" at
graduations as well as other events.
While the decision today was not a
surprise, given the justices' evident skepticism
about the Santa Fe Independent School
District's prayer policy when the case was
argued in March, it was nonetheless notable in
several respects. One was the majority's firm
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rejection of the school district's central
argument in defense of its policy: the prayers
were private student speech that could not be
attributed to the school district itself and could
not be considered an unconstitutional
"establishment" of religion in violation of the
First Amendment.
Indeed, the district had argued, to hold that
students could not express their religious views
would create a separate First Amendment
problem, amounting to the censorship of
religious speech in a public forum.
But this was not private speech, and a
football game was not a public forum for
unbridled free expression, Justice Stevens said.
"These invocations are authorized by a
government policy and take place on
government property at government-sponsored
school-related events," he said, adding that any
member of the audience would perceive the
student prayer as stamped with the school's
"seal of approval."
Justice Stevens added: "Contrary to the
district's repeated assertions that it has adopted
a 'hands-off approach to the pregame
invocation, the realities of the situation plainly
reveal that its policy involves both perceived
and actual endorsement of religion."
He noted that in contrast to a public
forum, in which contrasting views are welcome,
the Santa Fe policy "allows only one student,
the same student for the entire season, to give
the invocation." He said the policy clearly
indicated, without saying so explicitly, that what
was expected was a religious message,
"suggesting that a solemn, yet nonreligious,
message, such as commentary on United States
foreign policy, would be prohibited."
In an acerbic dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist said the majority
opinion "bristles with hostility to all things
religious in public life."
Chief Justice Rehnquist said that "neither
the holding nor the tone of the opinion is
faithful to the meaning of the Establishment
Clause," at least as understood by George
Washington, who proclaimed a day of "public
thanksgiving and prayer" at the request of "the
very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights."
The chief justice said the majority was
adopting so rigid a view of church-state
separation that "under the Court's logic, a
public school that sponsors the singing of the
national anthem before football games violates
the Establishment Clause" because the
concluding verse contains the phrase "And this
be our motto: 'In God is our trust.' "
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas joined the chief justice's dissenting
opinion. The majority opinion was joined by
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M.
Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
Justice Stevens appeared to go out of his
way to refute the dissenters' accusation that the
majority was hostile to religion. "By no means,"
he said, did the Constitution "impose a
prohibition on all religious activity in our public
schools" or stop "any public school student
from voluntarily praying at any time before,
during, or after the school day." He added: "But
the religious liberty protected by the
Constitution is abridged when the state
affirmatively sponsors the particular practice of
prayer."
The case, Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, No. 99-62, began in 1995 when
two families, one Mormon and the other
Catholic, sued to stop a variety of religious
practices in the 4,000-student district near
Galveston, Tex. Permitted by the Federal
District Court to proceed anonymously because
of the possibility of harassment, the plaintiffs
won an initial ruling that prompted several
187
changes in the school district's policy as the
litigation continued.
The dissenting justices objected today that
the majority lacked a basis for striking down the
policy, which had never taken effect, on its
face, but should let it take effect and see if any
problems developed. But the majority declared
firmly that there was no need to wait. In fact,
Justice Stevens said, the election system itself
was part of the constitutional problem "because
it establishes an improper majoritarian election
on religion" and "encourages divisiveness along
religious lines."
Also notable was the majority's rejection of
the school district's effort to describe the policy
as a "content-neutral" effort to provide a
solemn atmosphere at football games. "We
refuse to turn a blind eye to the context in
which this policy arises," Justice Stevens said,
"and that context quells any doubt that this
policy was implemented with the purpose of
endorsing school prayer."
Gov. George W. Bush of Texas, who
signed the state's brief in support of the school
district, called the ruling "disappointing." In a
statement put out by his office in Austin, Mr.
Bush said: "I support the constitutionally
guaranteed right of all students to express their
faith freely and participate in voluntary,
student-led prayer."
Julie Underwood, general counsel of the
National School Boards Association, praised
the decision and said she would advise school
districts that they should now regard student-
led graduation prayers as unconstitutional as
well. "This decision emphasizes that we don't
have prayer at school sponsored events,
period," she said in an interview, adding:
"Children shouldn't made to feel excluded or
coerced."
Copyright @2000 The New York Times
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SCHOOL PRAYER REJECTED
High Court Bans Student-Led Acts
USA Today
Tuesday, June 20, 2000
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court on
Monday delivered its strongest rejection of
prayer in public schools in nearly a decade,
forbidding invocations at school activities even
when students organize them. The 6-3 ruling
involved prayer at football games in Texas, but
likely will prevent such rituals at graduations
and other school events.
Ruling that pre-kickoff prayers violate the
First Amendment's separation of church and
state, the court provided an unusually direct
condemnation of school-sanctioned prayer.
"School sponsorship of a religious message is
impermissible because it (tells) members of the
audience who are non-adherents that they are
outsiders," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote.
Just as the debate over school prayer has
split parts of the USA, the decision in a Texas
case divided the court. Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, writing the dissent for himself,
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, said the
majority opinion "bristles with hostility to all
things religious in public life."
The court's ruling generated particularly
emotional reactions in the South, where pre-
game prayers are as much a tradition as the coin
toss. Civil libertarians declared victory and
praised the court for citing school officials'
behind-the-scenes involvement in prayers.
But church groups and others who believe
that students should be able to publicly express
their faith say the court is out of step with most
Americans, who in polls have supported
classroom prayers. Prayer supporters hope the
ruling will renew interest in a constitutional
amendment to allow school prayer and
highlight the importance of the next president's
appointments to the court.
Texas Gov. George W. Bush, the likely
GOP presidential nominee, called the ruling
"disappointing" and said he backs the "right of
all students to participate in voluntary, student-
led prayer." Vice President Gore, the likely
Democratic nominee, declined to comment.
The case began when two families, Catholic
and Mormon, sued the Santa Fe (Texas) school
district, claiming that officials were engaging in
Christian proselytizing in an array of school
activities. The justices focused their inquiry on a
district policy allowing students to vote on
whether they want a pre-game message,
religious or secular, to promote sportsmanship.
In 1992, the court rejected administrator-
arranged prayers at public school graduations.
On Monday, justices turned back the notion
that similar prayers are any more acceptable if
led by students.
The prayers "are authorized by a
government policy and take place on
government property at government-
sponsored" events, wrote Stevens, joined by
Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer.
Major rulings on prayer in schools. Action
by the Supreme Court:
1962-Rules against a New York law that
required students to recite a state-written prayer
each day.
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1980-Strikes down a Kentucky law that
ordered schools to post the Ten
Commandments.
1985-Rejects an Alabama law that allowed a
moment of silence for prayer each day.
1990-Rules that student religious groups
could meet in Nebraska highschools.
1992-Rules against prayers organized by
administrators at graduations in Rhode Island.
Monday-Rejects student-led prayers at
football games in Texas. Ruling may apply to
graduation ceremonies.
Copyright 2000 Gannett Company, Inc.
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Last Tenn:
Leila Jeanne HILL, Audrey Himmelmann, and Everitt W. Simpson, Jr.
V.
COLORADO et al.
No. 98-1856
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 28, 2000
TWO VICTORIES FOR ABORTION RIGHTS: JUSTICES
UPHOLD COLORADO 'BUBBLE,' REJECT NEBRASKA LATE-
TERM BAN
The Denver Post
Thursday, June 29, 2000
Bill McALIster
WASHINGTON - A sharply divided U.S.
Supreme Court gave abortion-rights advocates
two major victories Wednesday as it upheld a
Colorado law restricting protests outside
medical clinics and rejected a Nebraska law
banning controversial late-term abortions.
Declaring that individuals have 'a right to be
let alone,' the high court upheld Colorado's so-
called 'bubble law' by a 6-3 vote. The 1993 law
creates an 8-foot zone, or bubble,
around individuals entering medical facilities
and bars protesters from entering those
bubbles.
By a 5-4 vote, the court threw out the
Nebraska law that banned what opponents call
'partial-birth' abortions. The ruling, the latest
decision reaffirming the court's landmark 1973
abortion ruling, declared that Nebraska had
placed 'an undue burden' on a woman's right to
seek an abortion.
Both decisions, coming on the final day of
the court's current term, provoked sharply
worded decisions and bitter dissents. 'Does the
deck seem stacked?' complained Justice
Antonin Scalia, the court's most passionate
abortion foe. 'You bet.'
The court's six-member majority rejected
Scalia's arguments and praised the Colorado
legislature for drafting a law that doesn't
mention abortion but does place restrictions
on individuals. The bubble law establishes a
100-foot zone in front of medical facilities and
prohibits protesters from walking within 8 feet
of people there.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O'Connor, David Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer voted to uphold
the bubble law. Scalia and Justices Clarence
Thomas and Anthony Kennedy dissented.
Writing for the majority, Stevens rejected
the arguments of the three Colorado women
who called themselves 'sidewalk counselors' and
claimed their free speech rights under the
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First Amendment were jeopardized by the 1993
state law.
'Under this statute, absolutely no channel of
communication is foreclosed,' Stevens
countered. 'No speaker is silenced. And
no message is prohibited
'This statute simply empowers private
citizens entering a health care facility with the
ability to prevent a speaker, who is within 8 feet
and advancing, from communicating a message
they do not wish to hear.'
The majority held that is acceptable and
cited as support the 'right to be let alone' that
the late Justice Louis Brandeis, 'one of our
wisest justices,' articulated in a 1928 dissent.
Stevens did, however, acknowledge that the
Colorado law 'will sometimes inhibit a
demonstrator whose approach, in fact, would
have proved harmless. But the statute's
prophylactic aspect is justified by the great
difficulty of protecting, say, a pregnant woman
from physical harassment.'
Abortion-rights advocates expressed delight
with the two rulings, but anti-abortion groups
were furious. 'It's incredibly disappointing,' said
Jeannie Hill of Wheat Ridge, one of the
three Colorado anti-abortion activists. 'We're
very surprised by the Supreme Court. This was
our last recourse. Now we have to be
under threat of arrest everywhere we go.'
The law makes intrusion on the 'bubble' a
Class 3 misdemeanor punishable by a $ 750 fine
and up to six months in jail.
Attorney Jay Sekulow, who had argued
Hill's case before the court on behalf of the
conservative American Center for Law
and Justice, called the ruling 'both troubling and
damaging.' He said it 'restricts constitutional
rights, suppresses freedom and underscores the
fact that sadly there is an abortion
speech exception to the First Amendment.'
Officials on both sides said the narrow
ruling in the Nebraska case ensures that
abortion will be an issue in the
coming presidential race. President Clinton
seemed to agree, telling a news conference that
the next president will have two to four seats
on the court to fill.
That leaves the future of abortion rights
'very much in the balance,' he said.
Some top congressional Republican
supported that idea. 'More than anything, this
decision demonstrates the urgent need to put
a president in the White House who will insist
on appointing members of the judiciary who do
not view the Constitution as a launch pad for
contrived legal theories,' said Rep. Tom DeLay,
R-Texas, an abortion opponent.
Vice President Al Gore, the presumptive
Democratic nominee for president, declined
through a spokesman to comment on
the Colorado ruling. His campaign did issue a
statement on the Nebraska case, noting that
Texas Gov. George W. Bush, the certain GOP
presidential nominee, had said he would name
justices like Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who
dissented in both cases.
The Colorado ruling was a personal
triumph for Rep. Diana DeGette, D-Colo., who
drafted the law while in the state legislature.
'We scored a tremendous victory for patients'
rights today,' she said in a statement. 'The court
affirmed what Colorado has long embraced -
that our citizens have a right to
medical treatment without the fear of being
harassed or intimidated.'
Eighteen states had joined the case in
support of the Colorado law. DeGette and Jim
Henderson, another lawyer for the American
Center for Law and Justice, predicted that a
number of governments will now enact laws
based on the Colorado statute.
Henderson said Massachusetts, Phoenix
and Santa Barbara, Calif., which have been
considering similar laws, are likely to be among
the first.
'John Paul Stevens has put a pillow on the
First Amendment and has killed it,' Henderson
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said, noting that the liberal American Civil
Liberties Union and labor's AFL-CIO had
joined in the fight against the Colorado law on
the basis of free speech.
In a strong dissent in the Colorado case,
Scalia ridiculed the majority opinion as 'one of
many aggressively pro-abortion novelties
announced by the court in recent years.' He
accused the majority of pushing aside 'whatever
doctrines of constitutional law stand in the
way,' of abortion.
The court's majority opinion noted that
none of the three Colorado women who
brought the case were abusive
or confrontational in their protests. But Stevens
pointed out that wasn't always the case. He said
protests described to the state legislature as it
considered the bill were often highly
emotional and 'there was also evidence that
emotional confrontations may adversely affect a
patient's medical care.'
Three Colorado courts considered the
women's complaints, and all the courts rejected
them, including the Colorado Supreme Court.
In the Nebraska case, Justice Stephen
Breyer offered a detailed, clinical description of
the late-term abortion procedures that millions
of Americans consider murder.
While Americans hold 'virtually irreconcilable
points of view' over abortion, Breyer said the
court majority remains committed to protect a
'woman's right to choose' that it first
proclaimed 27 years ago in Roe vs. Wade.
'Our cases have repeatedly invalidated
statutes that in the process of regulating the
methods of abortion, impose significant health
risks,' he wrote. By detailing what types of
abortion are proper, Nebraska has effectively
placed the health of some women at risk, he
said.
Copyright C) 2000 The Denver Post
Corporation
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ABORTION WAR OF WORDS GOES ON AT DENVER CLINIC
Protesters Continue Action at Facilty on Vine Street
Denver Rocky Mountain News
Thursday, June 29,2000
Lisa Levitt Ryckman
Jo Scott brought her ladder so she could
look over the fence and into the clinic parking
lot.
Corine Miller brought the extra-large soft-
drink cup she uses as a megaphone. Delores
Chavez and Margaret Roush brought their
daughters.
They all came armed with hand-lettered
signs, gruesome photos, righteous indignation
and a heartfelt message: Abortion is murder.
The war of words went on Wednesday at
Planned Parenthood's Vine Street clinic even
though a battle had been lost.
The U.S. Supreme Court had issued a
ruling that upheld Colorado's "bubble" law,
which requires Scott, Miller and their fellow
protesters to stay eight feet from anyone
entering the clinic.
During arguments before the justices in
January, one of the three Colorado challengers,
Leila Jeanne Hill, stood outside the Supreme
Court building with a postcard displaying a
smiley face and the statement "I think we're
going to have our First Amendment rights back
this summer."
There were no smiley faces on Vine Street
Wednesday.
"This country thrives on unrighteous
laws," Scott said. "Abortion's legal, and they're
going to do everything they can to make killing
children easy."
The ruling surprised none of these
sidewalk soldiers.
"We knew that it would happen," Scott
said. "But it won't stop us. We're very creative,
resourceful people. We'll find a way around it."
On those rare occasions when clients
approach the clinic on foot, Scott said she and
other protesters can still get close enough to
make eye contact and deliver their message. But
most of the time, women arrive by car and are
whisked into the parking lot, where off-duty
police officers and volunteer escorts await
them.
When that happens, Scott climbs her
ladder so she can shout over the canvas-lined
fence that separates the lot from the street.
"This is not an option! This is murder!"
But that's as close as she gets.
"It's a curb to the in-your-face tactics that
were so common before the passage of the
bubble law," said Ellen Brilliant, Planned
Parenthood spokeswoman. "When there's a
safe space created, it decreases the potential for
violence."
The bubble law hasn't been enforced,
mostly because it's up to the woman and her
family to press charges. The penalty for
violating the law is up to six months in jail and
a $750 fine. But the protesters, who have been
arrested for littering, loitering and disturbing
the peace, aren't worried.
"It's business as usual, either way," Miller
said.
For more than three years, the Littleton
woman has been coming to the clinic to
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perform a piece of street theater that she
believes has changed women's minds.
"I do a 'voice of the unborn child,' " Miller
said. "It's an emotional plea from the baby to
its mother for its life. You want to hear it?"
She pointed her makeshift megaphone at
the clinic wall.
"Mommy! Mommy!" Miller wailed between
sobs. "I love you, Mommy! I love you,
Mommy! Take me home now! I don't want to
die! Look me in the eyes, Mommy! Look me in
the eyes now and tell me why, why are you
doing this to me? Why? Why?
"My last words to you Mommy: I love you,
Mommy! Remember me, Mommy! My life is in
your hands - or my blood is ON YOUR
HANDS!"
But inside the Vine Street clinic, concrete
walls muffled her words, and music and
daytime television drowned them out.
Copyright C 2000 Denver Publishing Company
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Last Term:
Jeremiah W. (Jay) NIXON, Attorney General of Missouri, et al., Petitioners
V.
SHRINK Missouri Government PAC et al.
No. 98-963
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 28, 2000
CAMPAIGN GIFT LIMITS REAFFIRMED; COURT UPHOLDS POWER TO CURB
DONATIONS
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, January 25,2000
Lyle Denniston
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court
surprisingly reaffirmed yesterday sweeping
power for the federal and state governments to
curb donations to political candidates.
After a long trend of giving the political
financing system greater freedom from
regulation, the court did a considerable
turnabout, revitalizing a 24-year-old decision
that supports strict limits on contributions to
candidates.
The justices, dividing 6-3, upheld a 1994
Missouri law that sets a limit of $1,075 on
contributions to statewide candidates, slightly
higher than the $1,000 limit that Congress
imposed in 1976 for federal campaign
donations.
The court indicated that there would
probably be no constitutional problem if the
figure was set lower. Such low ceilings, donors
and candidates argue, do not keep pace with
inflation and the rising costs of campaigning.
The high court made clear that Congress
and state legislatures need not show evidence
that money corrupts elections in order to
exercise their power to reduce the influence of
large donors.
Noting a broad threat of "politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large
contributors," Justice David H. Souter wrote
for the majority: "The cynical assumption that
large donors call the tune could jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.
"The dangers of large, corrupt
contributions and the suspicion that large
contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor
implausible."
The decision emboldened those who want
to tighten public controls on political financing.
Sen. Russell D. Feingold, a Wisconsin
Democrat and a leader of the congressional
bloc that has failed to pass federal legislation
limiting donations, said in a statement that the
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court's ruling "has greatly advanced our efforts
to reform our elections."
Republicans who have led the fight against
new limits on campaign contributions have
argued that such limits, if passed by Congress,
would be struck down by the Supreme Court.
The court's decision yesterday appears to
seriously undercut that argument. Feingold
suggested that the decision "put to rest any
doubts about the constitutionality" of limits on
campaign donations.
Cleta D. Mitchell, a Washington attorney
and leading opponent of campaign finance
restrictions, portrayed the Supreme Court
ruling as narrow. The ruling, she said, was little
more than a restatement of part of a 1976
decision upholding Congress' power to limit
contributions to candidates. She noted that the
justices said nothing about another part of that
decision that struck down efforts to limit
candidates' own spending.
But Mitchell expressed concern about how
advocates of campaign finance limits would
read the ruling. "The 'reformers' are never
finished reforming and regulating," she said.
Although the majority did not say so in
specific words, the ruling appeared to clear the
way constitutionally for legislatures to restrict
"soft money" -- the unlimited, unregulated
contributions to political parties that help their
candidates, even though the money does not go
directly into the candidates' campaign coffers.
Soft money is a leading source of campaign
financing and is the chief target of those who
want to reduce the effect of big donations on
politics.
Yesterday's case, Nixon vs. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, had appeared to be a
difficult test for the court on constitutional
issues surrounding campaign finance. Yet the
majority decided it with apparent ease and, in
fact, treated the result as almost self-evident.
Missouri's Legislature, Souter wrote, had
ample reason to believe that large contributions
were having a corrupting influence on elected
state officials, or at least giving voters the
impression that money could corrupt. The
court refused to require any minimum
threshold of proof of corruption before
campaign donations could be curbed.
In addition, the court seemed to relax its
understanding of what could constitute
corruption in politics. Previously, it had
appeared to support limits on campaign
donations primarily when politicians performed
explicit favors in return for donations. That
requirement of "quid pro quo" evidence was
dropped yesterday.
The ruling exposed a deep split between
the majority and the dissenters on the
constitutionality of campaign finance limits.
Justice Clarence Thomas, in a biting dissenting
opinion, wrote: "The majority today, rather
than going out of its way to protect political
speech, goes out of its way to avoid protecting
it."
Thomas argued that the majority had relied
on a view of political corruption that did not
amount to anything like corruption.
Thomas and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy
and Antonin Scalia argued that the Supreme
Court should reconsider its 1976 ruling in the
case of Buckley vs. Valeo, the court's most
important constitutional ruling on campaign
finance. Yet, the majority appeared to have
strengthened that ruling's support of campaign
finance curbs.
The three justices dissented, arguing that
the Missouri campaign donation limits --
ranging from $250 to $1,075 per donor for
statewide candidates -- violate the First
Amendment because they severely restrict
protected political expression by donors and
the candidates they favor.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer supported
Souter's majority opinion, but said he, too,
would favor reconsidering the 1976 ruling if
that decision came to be understood to deprive
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legislatures of wide authority to restrict
campaign spending and contributions. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg supported Breyer's
separate opinion.
Joining the Souter majority, besides Breyer
and Ginsburg, were Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
and John Paul Stevens.
Copyright ( 2000 The Baltimore Sun
Company
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COURT SEES CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AS WAY TO PREVENT CORRUPTION
New Jersey LawJournal
January31, 2000
Tony Mauro
In a 6-3 decision last Monday, the Supreme
Court upheld Missouri's caps on campaign
contributions, potentially clearing the way for
limits lower than the $1,000 federal threshold.
After years of doubt over the current
Court's take on campaign finance reform and
the First Amendment, the ruling in Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC underlines
the Court's support for limits on contributions
as a way to prevent corruption in government.
And the justices agreed that the 1976 ruling in
Buckley v. Valeo did not require states to come
up with extensive "empirical evidence" of actual
corruption to justify limiting contributions.
"There is little reason to doubt that
sometimes large campaign contributions will
work actual corruption of our political system,
and no reason to question the existence of a
corresponding suspicion among voters," wrote
Justice David Souter for the majority.
"The Court's opinion is a victory for
democracy," President
Bill Clinton said in a statement Monday.
"Today's decision sets the stage for further
reform."
Souter announced the ruling to a nearly
empty courtroom. Only four of the nine
justices were on the bench, and only a handful
of spectators in the Court, on a day when
access to the building was limited in
anticipation of anti-abortion rallies outside.
Justice Clarence Thomas was absent because of
the sudden death of his brother on Sunday,
Court officials said.
In the Nixon campaign reform case, Justice
John Paul Stevens in a concurring opinion
reiterated the view in Buckley that limits on
contributions to candidates are less
constitutionally suspect than direct limits on
speech. "Money is property; it is not speech.
The right to use one's money to hire gladiators,
or to fund 'speech by proxy,' certainly merits
significant constitutional protection," Stevens
wrote.
"These property rights, however, are not
entitled to the same protection as the right to
say what one pleases."
That somewhat relaxed view of the hurdles
states must overcome to pass campaign
contribution limits will give "states a real boost
of confidence that their limits will be upheld,"
says Deborah Goldberg of the Brennan Center
for Justice, which has argued in favor of
limiting both contributions and spending. "This
strengthens the side of Buckley that upholds
contribution limits."
Rehnquist, O'Connor Join Majority
Goldberg also pointed to the fact that the
majority included Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
who had shown some signs of wavering on
Buckley in recent decisions. The other justices
in the majority were Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer.
"Today's opinion stops the backsliding that
lower courts have done over the past 10 years
and returns us to where we were with the
Buckley v. Valeo decision," said Derek
Gressman of U.S.Public Interest Research
Group.
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Souter's opinion could be used to justify
contribution limits even lower than the $1,000
limit embodied in federal law and the $1,075 in
the Missouri law under challenge. He said there
was no evidence that the Missouri limit created
a "system of suppressed political advocacy." In
examining future limits, Souter said the test
should be "whether the contribution limitation
was so radical in effect as to render political
association ineffective, drive the sound of a
candidate's voice below the level of notice, and
render contributions pointless."
Bobby Burchfield of Covington & Burling
said Souter's formulation won't help lower
courts decide "what factors can be used in
deciding what level is acceptable." Burchfield,
who wrote a brief against the limits for Sen.
Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., said the ruling
"doesn't change the landscape much."
Certainly the decision Monday does not
disturb the other half of Buckley -- the Court's
judgment that while limits on contributions to
candidates are OK, limits on spending by
candidates violate their free speech rights. A
concurrence by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justice Ginsburg suggests that Buckley leaves
legislators "broad authority" to regulate soft
money and enact other reforms such as
reduced-price time for candidates on broadcast
media. He also said post-Buckley experiences
might call for a reconsideration of Buckley, at
lease insofar as "making less absolute the
contribution/expenditure line."
But dissents in the case make it clear that a
solid bloc of three justices -- Anthony
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia
-- still see significant threats to the First
Amendment in current limits on campaign
money.
Dissenters See Indifference
In a strongly worded dissent, Kennedy said
the majority was "almost indifferent" to the
consequences of the decision on "the speech
upon which democracy depends." He adds that
"Buckley has not worked," citing the growing
use of 'soft money,' which is unregulated
because it does not go directly to candidates.
"The Court has forced a substantial amount of
speech underground, as contributors and
candidates devise ever more elaborate methods
of avoiding contribution limits.
He called Buckley a "halfway house" that
ought to be eliminated. But Kennedy, while
urging that Buckley be overruled, stopped short
of saying that all forms of campaign money
limits would be unconstitutional. He said he
would invite Congress to devise a new system
that takes First Amendment concerns into
account.
Thomas went further, however, in a dissent
joined by Scalia. By embracing the Buckley
framework, the majority has managed again to
"balance away First Amendment freedoms,"
Thomas wrote. He urged the use of "strict
scrutiny" to evaluate the Missouri law, a
standard under which the state limits would be
"patently unconstitutional," as would any other
limit on spending or contributions. Thomas
asserted that "contributions to political
campaigns generate essential political speech,"
and as such cannot be limited.
Bribery laws are adequate to attack the evils
legislators are trying to end with campaign
finance laws, Thomas says. "States are free to
enact laws that directly punish those engaged in
corruption, but they are not free to enact
generalized laws that suppress a tremendous
amount of speech along with the targeted
corruption," Thomas wrote.
Copyright C 2000 American Lawyer
Newspapers Group, Inc.
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BARTNICKI v. VOPPER
&
UNITED STATES v. VOPPER
The First Amendment v. The Right to Pivacy
Meredith Lugo*
Is an individual's right to privacy imperiled when he or she talks on a cellular phone? Does the
press have an unassailable right under the First Amendment to publish truthful information, even if
such information was illegally obtained? The Supreme Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper will answer these
questions in deciding the constitutionality of provisions of the Federal Wiretapping Act which create
both civil and criminal causes of action against anyone who intentionally uses or discloses the contents
of any communication which he knows or has reason to know was illegally intercepted, even if he is not
responsible for such interception.
The communication at issue in the case is a telephone conversation between high-ranking members
of a local teacher's union regarding heated ongoing contract negotiations. During the course of the
conversation one of the parties threatened to "blow off [the school board members'] front porches."
This conversation was recorded by an unknown person who left the tape in the mailbox of one of the
defendants, who presided over an organization opposed to the demands of the teacher's union. He in
turn gave the tape to the defendant radio host who repeatedly played it on-air. The two union members
filed suit in federal court under both the Federal and Pennsylvania Wiretapping Acts, and the federal
government intervened to defend the constitutionality of that portion of the federal statute that
imposed liability on those who broadcast illegally obtained communications.
Guided throughout by a recognition of Supreme Court precedent which has generally weighed
freedom of the press above an individual's right to privacy, a panel majority of the United States Courts
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held these provisions of the state and federal statutes unconstitutional.
The majority opinion, written by Judge Dolores Sloviter, began with a consideration of the "level of
scrutiny" to be applied and determined that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate, accepting the
government's argument that both the state and federal statutes were content-neutral. To survive
intermediate scrutiny a regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.
While conceding the validity of the overall purpose of protecting privacy, the majority rejected the
proffered justifications for the specific provisions at issue in this case. Since none of the defendants
sued by Bartnicki were responsible for the interception of the call, the desire to deny the wrongdoer the
fruits of his labor was inapplicable. The majority further concluded that the government contention
that the provisions, by eliminating the demand for intercepted materials by third parties, had a deterrent
effect on the act of interception was without merit, a mere unsupported hypothesis.
The dissent argued that the regulations survived intermediate scrutiny and were therefore
constitutional. Judge Louis Pollak found a direct connection between the provisions creating a cause of
action for disclosure and the prevention of the interception itself. He argued that in order to effectively
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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protect privacy not just the initial trespass but also the subsequent disclosure or use of the intercepted
material must be prohibited and punishable. In support of his argument he pointed out that of the
states which have wiretapping statutes, half include similar provisions. However, as the majority rightly
countered, this merely means that half of them do not.
Further complicating matters for the Court is a previous seemingly contrary decision by the D.C.
Circuit. In Boehner v. McDermott (1999) Congressman John Boehner (R-Ohio) sued Congressman James
McDermott (D-Washington) under the same federal statutory provision for turning over a tape of a
confidential telephone conversation between members of the Republican Party leadership, including
Newt Gingrich, concerning his investigation by the House Ethics Committee and involving conduct
which may have violated the terms of his agreement with the committtee, to various newspapers. The
court held the provision did not abridge McDermott's freedom of speech. Boehner, however, can easily
be distinguished from Bartnicki: the D.C. Circuit was careful to point out that the newspapers which
published articles relying on the tape were not defendants in the suit, and the court suggested that
McDermott may have had some culpability in the original illegal transaction.
Bartnicki will provide the Supreme Court with its latest opportunity to attempt to strike the delicate
balance that must be maintained in our society between freedom of the press and the individual right to
privacy in one's own conversations.
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99-1687 Bartnicki v. Vopper
Ruling below (3d Cir., 200 F.3d 109, 68 U.S.L.W. 1397):
Civil liability provisions of federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. 52511(1)(c), and Pennsylvania Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, which bar intentional disclosure of contents of wire, oral, or
electronic communication by one who has reason to know that information was obtained through
interception in violation of statute, violate First Amendment as applied to individual who furnished,
and media defendants who published, tape recording of intercepted conversation of public significance
but had no role in its interception.
Question presented: Do federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping statutes violate First Amendment
insofar as they prohibit disclosure or other use of unlawfully intercepted electronic communication by
person who was not involved in interception itself, but who knows or has reason to know that
communication was unlawfully intercepted?
99-1728 United States v. Vopper
Ruling below (Bartnicki v. Vopper, 3d Cir., 200 F.3d 109, 68 U.S.L.W. 1397):
Civil liability provision of federal wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. 52511(1)(c), which bars intentional
disclosure of contents of wire, oral, or electronic communication by one who has reason to know that
information was obtained through interception in violation of statute, violates First Amendment as
applied to individual who furnished, and media defendants who published, tape recording of
intercepted conversation of public significance but had no role in its interception.
Question presented: Does imposition of civil liability under 18 U.S.C. §2511 (1)(c) and (d) for using or
disclosing contents of illegally intercepted communications, when defendant knows or has reason to
know that interception was unlawful but is not alleged to have participated in or encouraged it, violate
First Amendment?
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Gloria BARTNICKI, et al.
V.
Frederick W. VOPPER, et al., Appellants
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
Decided December 27, 1999
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge:
At issue is whether the First Amendment
precludes imposition of civil damages for the
disclosure of portions of a tape recording of an
intercepted telephone conversation containing
information of public significance when the
defendants, two radio stations, their reporter,
and the individual who furnished the tape
recording, played no direct or indirect role in
the interception.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
From the beginning of 1992 until the
beginning of 1994, Wyoming Valley West
School District was in contract negotiations
with the Wyoming Valley West School District
Teachers' Union (the "Teachers' Union") over
the terms of the teachers' new contract. The
negotiations, which were markedly contentious,
generated significant public interest and were
frequently covered by the news media.
Plaintiffs Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F.
Kane, Jr., as well as defendant Jack Yocum, all
were heavily involved in the negotiating
process. Bartnicki was the chief negotiator on
behalf of the Teachers' Union. Kane, a teacher
at Wyoming Valley West High School, served
as president of the local union. Yocum served
as president of the Wyoming Valley West
Taxpayers' Association, an organization formed
by local citizens for the sole purpose of
opposing the Teachers' Union's proposals.
In May of 1993, Bartnicki, using her cellular
phone, had a conversation with Kane. They
discussed whether the teachers would obtain a
three-percent raise, as suggested by the
Wyoming Valley West School Board, or a six-
percent raise, as suggested by the Teachers'
Union. In the course of their phone
conversation, Kane stated:
If they're not going to move for three percent,
we're gonna have to go to their, their homes ...
to blow off their front porches, we'll have to do
some work on some of those guys . . . . Really,
uh, really and truthfully, because this is, you
know, this is bad news (undecipherable) The
part that bothers me, they could still have kept
to their three percent, but they're again
negotiating in the paper. This newspaper report
knew it was three percent. What they should
have said, 'we'll meet and discuss this.' You
don't discuss the items in public.
*** Bartnicki responded, "No," and, Kane
continued, "You don't discuss this in public...
Particularly with the press." ***
This conversation, including the statements
quoted above, was intercepted and recorded by
an unknown person, and the tape left in
Yocum's mailbox. Yocum retrieved the tape,
listened to it, and recognized the voices of
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Bartnicki and Kane. He then gave a copy of the
tape to Fred Williams, also known as Frederick
W. Vopper, of WILK Radio and Rob Neyhard
of WARM Radio, both local radio stations.
Williams repeatedly played part of the tape on
the air as part of the Fred Williams Show, a
radio news/public affairs talk show which is
broadcast simultaneously over WILK Radio
and WGBI-AM. The tape was also aired on
some local television stations and written
transcripts were published in some newspapers.
B.
Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum, Williams,
WILK Radio, and WGBI Radio (hereafter
"media defendants") under both federal and
state law. They based their federal claims on
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 28 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., and their state
claims on the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 5701 et seq. As relief, Bartnicki
and Kane sought (1) actual damages in excess
of $ 50,000, (2) statutory damages under 18
U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2), (3) liquidated damages
under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5725(a)(1), (4)
punitive damages, and (5) attorneys' fees and
costs.
Bartnicki, Kane, and the defendants each
moved for summary judgment. The District
Court denied these motions on June 14, 1996
and denied defendants' motion to reconsider on
November 8, 1996, specifically holding that
imposing liability on the defendants would not
violate the First Amendment.
The District Court subsequently certified
two questions as controlling questions of law:
"(1) whether the imposition of liability on the
media Defendants under the [wiretapping
statutes] solely for broadcasting the
newsworthy tape on the Defendant Fred
Williams' radio news/public affairs program,
when the tape was illegally intercepted and
recorded by unknown persons who were not
agents of the Defendants, violates the First
Amendment; and (2) whether imposition of
liability under the aforesaid [wiretapping
statutes] on Defendant Jack Yocum solely for
providing the anonymously intercepted and
recorded tape to the media Defendants violates
the First Amendment." *** Williams, WILK
Radio, and WGBI Radio subsequently
petitioned for permission to appeal. Yocum
filed an answer to the petition in which he
joined the media defendants' request that we
hear this appeal. We granted the petition by
order dated February 26, 1998. The
Pennsylvania State Education Association
submitted a brief as amicus curiae in support of
the appellees, and the United States has
intervened as of right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. (
2403.
D.
The Federal Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the "Federal
Wiretapping Act") provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in
this chapter any person who --
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to
disclose, to any other person the contents of
any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication in violation of this
subsection ...
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shall be punished as provided in subsection (4)
or shall be subject to suit as provided in
subsection (5).
18 U.S.C. § 2511. It continues:
(a) In general. -- Except as provided in section
2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or
electronic communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of
this chapter may in a civil action recover from
the person or entity which engaged in the
violation such relief as may be appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 2520. The Federal
Wiretapping Act thus creates civil and criminal
causes of action against those who intentionally
use or disclose to another the contents of a
wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained in violation of the
statute.
The Pennsylvania Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control Act (the
"Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act") is similar. ***
Both Acts also explicitly authorize the recovery
of civil relief.
DISCUSSION
A.
As the District Court acknowledged and the
parties do not dispute, the media defendants
neither intercepted nor taped the conversation
between Bartnicki and Kane. Indeed, the record
does not disclose how or by whom the
conversation was intercepted. The media
defendants argued before the District Court
that these facts preclude a court from finding
them liable under the Wiretapping Acts. The
District Court disagreed. It concluded that, "a
violation of these acts can occur by the mere
finding that a defendant had a reason to believe
that the communication that he disclosed or
used was obtained through the use of an illegal
interception." *** It further opined that such an
interpretation of the statute "adheres to the
purpose of the act which was to protect wire
and oral communications and an individual's
privacy interest in such." *** The District Court
concluded that genuine disputes of material fact
remain regarding (1) whether the Bartnicki-
Kane conversation was illegally intercepted, and
if so (2) whether any or all of the defendants
knew or had reason to know that that
conversation was illegally intercepted. *** The
parties do not challenge these holdings on
appeal.
Hence, this case does not involve the
prohibitions of the Wiretapping Acts against
the actual interception of wire communications.
Nor does it involve any application of the Acts'
criminal provisions. Rather, this case focuses
exclusively on the portions of the Wiretapping
Acts that create causes of action for civil
damages against those who use or disclose
intercepted communications and who had
reason to know that the information was
received through an illegal interception.
C.
In order to determine whether the
provisions for civil sanctions from the
Wiretapping Acts may constitutionally be
applied to penalize defendants' disclosure, we
must first decide what degree of First
Amendment scrutiny should be applied.
The United States argues that the Federal
Wiretapping Act is subject to intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny. It bases this
contention on two subsidiary assertions: (1) that
these are "general laws that impose[ ] only
incidental burdens on expression" and (2) that
"to the extent that Title III restricts speech in
particular cases, it does so in an entirely
content-neutral fashion." *** It states that "[a]
statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny, if it
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furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and if the incidental restriction on
speech is not unnecessarily great." *** We
assume that the United States' arguments apply
equally to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act,
which is substantially similar to the Federal
Wiretapping Act.
We first consider the United States'
argument that the disclosure provisions of the
Wiretapping Acts merit only intermediate
scrutiny because they impose only incidental
burdens on expression.
[Tihe United States apparently suggests that
defendant's actions in disclosing the contents of
the Bartnicki-Kane conversation are properly
considered "expressive conduct" rather than
speech. If this is the thrust of the government's
citations, it is not persuasive. The acts on which
Bartnicki and Kane base their complaint are
Yocum's "intentionally disclos[ing a] tape to
several individuals and media sources" *** and
the media defendants' "intentionally disclos[ing]
and publish[ing] to the public the entire
contents of the private telephone conversation
between Bartnicki and Kane." *** If the acts of
"disclosing" and "publishing" information do
not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what
does fall within that category, as distinct from
the category of expressive conduct.
The United States nonetheless insists that
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate because the
statute, read as a whole, primarily prohibits
conduct rather than speech. ***
The government cites no support for the
surprising proposition that a statute that
governs both pure speech and conduct merits
less First Amendment scrutiny than one that
regulates speech alone. We are convinced that
this proposition does not accurately state First
Amendment law. ***
The United States' second argument -- that
intermediate scrutiny applies because the Acts
are content-neutral -- is more persuasive.
When the state uses a "content-based"
regulation to restrict free expression,
particularly political speech, that regulation is
subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." ***
By contrast, when the state places a
reasonable "content-neutral" restriction on
speech, such as a time, place and manner
regulation, that regulation need not meet the
same high degree of scrutiny. "Content-neutral"
restrictions are valid under the First
Amendment provided that they "are justified
without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of information." *
The Senate Report describes the purposes
of the Federal Wiretapping Act as: "(1)
protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications, and (2) delineating on a
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions
under which the interception of wire and oral
communications may be authorized." ***
Congress thus focused on privacy in adopting
18 U.S.C. 5 2511, the provision that prohibits
the interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications, as well as the use or
disclosure of the contents of illegally
intercepted communications. Congress did not,
however, define the privacy interest that it
intended the Act to protect.
As commonly understood, the right to
privacy encompasses both the right "to be free
from unreasonable intrusions upon [one's]
seclusion" and the right to be free from
"unreasonable publicity concerning [one's]
private life."
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We do not decide whether the Wiretapping
Acts would indeed be properly categorized as
content-based if justified on the basis of a need
to prevent the disclosure of private facts
because the United States for the most part
eschews reliance on that justification in
explaining the purpose of those acts. Instead,
the United States argues that "the fundamental
purpose of Title III is to maintain the
confidentiality of wire, electronic, and oral
communications." *** It reasons that
"prohibiting the use of illegally intercepted
communication . . . 'strengthens subsection
(1)(a),' the provision that imposes the
underlying ban on unauthorized interception,
'by denying the wrongdoer the fruits of his
labor' and by eliminating the demand for those
fruits by third parties." *** We are satisfied that
this latter justification does not rely on the
communicative impact of speech and,
therefore, that the Acts are properly treated as
content-neutral.
D.
Accordingly, we adopt the government's
position that we should apply intermediate
scrutiny in our analysis of the issue before us.
In doing so, we must first fix upon an
acceptable definition of the term "intermediate
scrutiny." *** Intermediate scrutiny is used by
the Court in a wide variety of cases calling for
some balancing. ***
The test usually applied in First
Amendment cases to content-neutral regulation
requires an examination of whether the
regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest" and "leaves
open ample alternative channels for
communication." *** There is a considerable
number of First Amendment cases in which the
Supreme Court, applying intermediate scrutiny,
has found that the regulation at issue, albeit
designed to advance legitimate state interests,
failed to withstand that scrutiny. ***
With the Supreme Court precedent as a
guide, we examine whether the government has
shown that its proffered interest is sufficiently
furthered by application to these defendants of
the damages provisions of the Wiretapping
Acts to justify the impingement on the
protected First Amendment interests at stake.
As noted above, the United States contends
that the Wiretapping Acts serve the
government's interest in protecting privacy by
helping "maintain the confidentiality of wire,
electronic, and oral communications." ***
Undoubtedly, this is a significant state interest.
We do not understand the defendants to deny
that there is an important governmental interest
served by the Wiretapping Acts. However, the
government recognizes that not all of the
provisions of the Wiretapping Acts are being
challenged. In fact, only a portion of those Acts
are at issue here -- the provisions imposing
damages and counsel fees for the use and
disclosure of intercepted material on those who
played no part in the interception.
The United States asserts that these
provisions protect the confidentiality of
communications in two ways: (1) "by denying
the wrongdoer the fruits of his labor" and (2)
"by eliminating the demand for those fruits by
third parties." *** In this case, however, there is
no question of "denying the wrongdoer the
fruits of his labor." The record is devoid of any
allegation that the defendants encouraged or
participated in the interception in a way that
would justify characterizing them as
"wrongdoers." Thus, the application of these
provisions to penalize an individual or radio
stations who did participate in the interception
and thereafter disclosed the intercepted material
is not before us.
We therefore focus on the United States'
second contention -- that the provisions
promote privacy by eliminating the demand for
intercepted materials on the part of third
parties. The connection between prohibiting
third parties from using or disclosing
intercepted material and preventing the initial
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interception is indirect at best. The United
States has offered nothing other than its ipse
dixit in support of its suggestion that imposing
the substantial statutory damages provided by
the Acts on Yocum or the media defendants
will have any effect on the unknown party who
intercepted the Bartnicki-Kane conversation.
Nor has the United States offered any basis for
us to conclude that these provisions have
deterred any other would-be interceptors. ***
Given the indirectness of the manner in which
the United States claims the provisions serve its
interest, we are not prepared to accept the
United States' unsupported allegation that the
statute is likely to produce the hypothesized
effect. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 *** ("The
Commonwealth has offered little more than
assertion and conjecture to support its claim
that without criminal sanctions the objectives
of the statutory scheme would be seriously
undermined."). Faced with nothing "more than
assertion and conjecture," it would be a long
stretch indeed to conclude that the imposition
of damages on defendants who were
unconnected with the interception even
"peripherally promoted" the effort to deter
interception. See Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S.
at 636.
When the state seeks to effectuate legitimate
state interests, it must do so by narrowly drawn
regulations designed to serve those interests
without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms. ***
[The Wiretapping Acts already provide for
punishment of the offender, i.e., the individual
who intercepted the wire communication and
who used or disclosed it. *** Those who
indirectly participated in the interception, either
by aiding or abetting, would also fall within the
sanctions provided by the statute. Therefore,
the government's desired effect can be reached
by enforcement of existing provisions against
the responsible parties rather than by imposing
damages on these defendants.
We are also concerned that the provisions
will deter significantly more speech than is
necessary to serve the government's asserted
interest. It is likely that in many instances these
provisions will deter the media from publishing
even material that may lawfully be disclosed
under the Wiretapping Acts.
Reporters often will not know the precise
origins of information they receive from
witnesses and other sources, nor whether the
information stems from a lawful source.
Moreover, defendants argue that they cannot be
held liable for use and publication of
information that had previously been disclosed.
Assuming this is so, reporters may have
difficulty discerning whether material they are
considering publishing has previously been
disclosed to the public. Such uncertainty could
lead a cautious reporter not to disclose
information of public concern for fear of
violating the Wiretapping Acts.
Bartnicki and Kane recognize that the
Supreme Court has frequently expressed
concern about the "timidity and self-
censorship" that may result from permitting the
media to be punished for publishing certain
truthful information. *** The public interest
and newsworthiness of the conversation
broadcast and disclosed by the defendants are
patent. In the conversation, the president of a
union engaged in spirited negotiations with the
School Board suggested "blowing off [the]
front porches" of the School Board members.
Nothing in the context suggests that this was
said in anything other than a serious vein.
Certainly, even if no later acts were taken to
follow through on the statement, and hence no
crime committed, the fact that the president of
the school teachers' union would countenance
the suggestion is highly newsworthy and of
public significance. Our concerns are only
heightened by the Supreme Court's admonition
in Smith that "state action to punish the
publication of truthful information seldom can
satisfy constitutional standards." ***
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Our dissenting colleague does not disagree
with any of the applicable legal principles. He
candidly states that the difference between us is
one of "ultimate application of [the agreed
upon] analysis to the case at bar." ***
Therefore, we add only a few brief comments
pertaining to that application.
Evidently, one of the principal differences
between our respective applications lies in the
,Weight we give the factors to be balanced. The
dissent suggests the Supreme Court's decisions
in Schneider, Struthers, and Scbaumburg are not
pertinent to this case because the state interests
in those cases (littered streets, annoying door-
to-door proselytizers, *** and fraudulent
charitable solicitors, respectively) were "not
very important." The dissent contrasts those
interests with the significant governmental
interest at issue here -- that of maintaining the
confidentiality of wire, electronic, and oral
communications.
Presumably, the dissent's point is that we
must weigh more heavily the privacy interests
furthered by the Wiretapping Acts than the
Court weighed the state interests in the three
cited cases. Given the conceded importance of
privacy and confidentiality at issue here, we
nonetheless find it difficult to accord it more
weight than the interests in preventing
disclosure of the name of a rape victim, the
identity of a judge in a putative disciplinary
proceeding, or the identity of a youth charged
as a juvenile offender at issue in Cox
Broadcasting, Landmark Communications and Smith,
respectively. Yet when faced with each of those
circumstances, the Supreme Court determined
that despite the strong privacy interest
underlying the statutory and state constitutional
provisions punishing disclosure of such
information, the interests served by the First
Amendment must take precedence. It would
7 Although we acknowledge that those decisions
arose from a stricter level of scrutiny than we
employ here and somewhat different
circumstances, the fact remains that the Court
be difficult to hold that privacy of telephone
conversations are more "important" than the
privacy interests the states unsuccessfully
championed in those cases.
In addition, we do not share the dissent's
confidence that imposition of civil liability on
those who neither participated in nor
encouraged the interception is an effective
deterrent to such interception. The dissent
finds such a nexus in the legislative landscape,
where half of the states that prohibit
wiretapping also authorize civil damage actions.
With due respect, we find this a slim reed, not
only because it appears from the dissent's
statistics that the other half of the states with
wiretapping statutes have not included a
damage provision but because the incidence of
state statutes, and hence "widespread legislative
consensus," does not prove the deterrent effect
of the prohibition. Indeed, there is not even
general agreement as to the deterrent effect of a
criminal statute on the perpetrator, *** much
less on those who were not in league with the
perpetrator. In determining whether a
regulation that restricts First Amendment rights
"substantially serves [its asserted] purposes,"
*** the Court has never found that question
satisfied by sheer numbers of state statutes.
The dissent engages in hyperbole when it
suggests that our decision "invalidates a portion
of the federal statute" and "by necessary
implication spells the demise of a portion of
more than twenty other state statutes." *** The
statutes, which are designed to prohibit and
punish wiretapping, remain unimpaired. All that
is at issue is the application of those statutes to
punish members of the media who neither
encouraged nor participated directly or
has generally tilted for the First Amendment in
the tension between press freedom and privacy
rights. This is bemoaned by the dissenting
Justices in The Florida Star, who state candidly
they "would strike the balance rather
differently." *** So, apparently, would the
dissent in this case.
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indirectly in the interception, an application
rarely attempted.
Moreover, we do not agree that the recent
decision in Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463
(D.C. Cit. 1999), presented that court with the
same issue presented here. Most particularly, in
Boehner, where a divided court upheld the
constitutionality of § 2511(1)(c), all three judges
emphasized in their separate opinions that there
was no effort to impose civil damages on the
newspapers (The New York Times, et al.)
which had printed the details of a conversation
that been illegally intercepted. Thus, for
example, in the lead opinion the court stated at
the outset, "nor should we be concerned with
whether § 2511 (1)(c) would be constitutional as
applied to the newspapers who published the
initial stories about the illegally-intercepted
conference call." *** Liability in that case was
sought to be imposed on James McDermott, a
congressman who caused a copy of the tape to
be given to the newspapers. Although
technically, defendant Yocum in our case
stands in the same position as McDermott, i.e.
as the source but not the interceptor, there is an
indication in Boehner that McDermott was more
than merely an innocent conduit. Indeed,
McDermott, unlike Yocum, knew who
intercepted the conversation because he
''accepted" the tape from the interceptors and,
the opinion suggests, not only sought to
embarrass his political opponents with the tape
but also promised the interceptors immunity
for their illegal conduct. *** In fact, the second
judge, who concurred in the judgment and in
only a portion of the opinion for the court,
specifically limited his concurrence to the
decision that § 2511(1)(c) "is not
unconstitutional as applied in this case," ***
and pointed out that "McDermott knew the
transaction was illegal at the time he entered
into it," ***. In contrast, Yocum has not been
shown to have "entered into" any transaction
with the interceptors. In the posture of this
case, all parties accept his allegation that the
tape was left in his mailbox.
The Boehner court was acutely aware that no
court has yet held that the government may
punish the press through imposition of
damages merely for publishing information of
public significance because its original source
acquired that information in violation of a
federal or state statute. *** As noted earlier in
this opinion, the Supreme Court has been asked
to permit a state to penalize the publication of
truthful information in at least four instances.
In three of the four cases, the statutes at issue
protected the privacy interests of such
vulnerable individuals as juveniles and the
victims of sexual assault. *** In the remaining
case, the statute at issue was meant to protect
the state's interest in an independent and ethical
judiciary. *** Despite the strength of the state
interests asserted, the Supreme Court in each
case concluded that those interests were
insufficient to justify the burdens imposed on
First Amendment freedoms.
We likewise conclude that the government's
significant interest in protecting privacy is not
sufficient to justify the serious burdens the
damages provisions of the Wiretapping Acts
place on free speech. We are skeptical that the
burden these provisions place on speech will
serve to advance the government's goals. Even
assuming the provisions might advance these
interests, the practical impact on speech is likely
to be "substantially broader than necessary."
We therefore hold that the Wiretapping
Acts fail the test of intermediate scrutiny and
may not constitutionally be applied to penalize
the use or disclosure of illegally intercepted
information where there is no allegation that
the defendants participated in or encouraged
that interception. It follows that we need not
decide whether these provisions leave open
ample alternative channels for communication
of information.
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, we will reverse
the order of the District Court denying
summary judgment to the defendants, and will
remand with directions to grant that motion.
POLLAK, District Judge, dissenting.
The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has recently determined, in
Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir.
1999), that the First Amendment does not bar a
civil damage action brought, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a), and
pursuant to the Florida statutory provisions
that are counterparts of the federal statute,
against one who, so the plaintiff alleged, gave to
the New York Times and other newspapers
copies of a tape recording of a telephone
conversation which the defendant had
"knowledge and reason to know" had been
unlawfully intercepted. *** Today this court
holds that the First Amendment does bar a civil
damage action brought, pursuant to the Federal
statute and its Pennsylvania counterpart, against
(1) one who handed over a copy of a taped
telephone conversation to a radio reporter, and
(2) the radio reporter and the two radio stations
that subsequently broadcast the tape, plaintiffs
having alleged that both the person who
handed over the tape and the radio reporter
had, in the statutory language, "reason to
know" that the taped conversation had been
intercepted in contravention of the federal and
Pennsylvania statutes. In the case decided today
the court addresses a broader range of issues
then those presented in Boehner v. McDermott: in
Boehner v. McDermott the only defendant was the
person who allegedly delivered to the media a
copy of a tape of an allegedly wrongfully
intercepted telephone conversation; in today's
case there are three "media defendants" in
addition to the defendant who allegedly
delivered to the media a copy of a tape of an
allegedly wrongfully intercepted telephone
conversation.2
I am in general agreement with the careful
analytic path traced by the court through the
minefield of First Amendment precedents.
However, I find myself in disagreement with
the court's ultimate application of its analysis to
the case at bar.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Where I part company with the court is in
its application of intermediate scrutiny in this
case.
A.
The court begins by acknowledging what I
take to be beyond dispute: namely, that the
professed governmental interest -- the interest
of the United States (which is presumably also
Pennsylvania's interest) in "maintaining the
confidentiality of wire, electronic, and oral
communications," * -- is "a significant state
interest." *** Then -- evidently with a view to
exploring whether the challenged prohibition
on disclosure or use of a conversation by one
who had "reason to know" that the
conversation was intercepted unlawfully is
"narrowly tailored to serve [that] significant
governmental interest" -- the court undertakes
to "focus on the United States' . . . contention .
. . that the provisions promote privacy by
eliminating the demand for intercepted
materials on the part of third parties." ***
With all respect, I find this portion of the
court's opinion unpersuasive:
First: I take issue with the proposition that
"the connection between prohibiting third
parties from using or disclosing intercepted
material and preventing the initial interception
2 The Boehner v. McDermott court was at pains to
point out the limited scope of its ruling.
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is indirect at best." "Preventing the initial
interception" is only part of the statutory
scheme. The statutory purposes, as the court
has noted, are "(1) protecting the privacy of
wire and oral communications, and (2)
delineating on a . uniform basis the
circumstances and conditions under which the
interception of wire and oral communications
may be authorized." *** Unauthorized
.interception of a communication is prohibited -
- and made both a criminal offense and an
event giving rise to civil liability -- both to
protect parties to a communication from an
initial trespass on their privacy and to protect
them from subsequent disclosure (and/or other
detrimental use). "Unless disclosure is
prohibited, there will be an incentive for illegal
interceptions; and unless disclosure is
prohibited, the damage caused by an illegal
interception will be compounded. It is not
enough to prohibit disclosure only by those
who conduct the unlawful eavesdropping. One
would not expect them to reveal publicly the
contents of the communication; if they did so
they would risk incriminating themselves. It was
therefore 'essential' for Congress to impose
upon third parties, that is, upon those not
responsible for the interception, a duty of non-
disclosure." Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d at
470.
Second: Given the close nexus between the
legislative prohibition on unauthorized
interception and the legislative imposition upon
"third parties, that is, upon those not
responsible for the interception, [of] a duty of
non-disclosure," I am puzzled by the court's
view that the argument presented by the United
States in support of the statutory regime of civil
liability lacks persuasiveness because it is not
supported by a demonstration that "imposing
the substantial statutory damages provided by
the Acts on Yocum or the media defendants
will have any effect on the unknown party who
intercepted the Bartnicki-Kane conversation,"
or "that these [statutory] provisions have
deterred any other would-be interceptors." Nor
do I think the court's view is buttressed by the
court's invocation of Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, ***. It is true that in Landmark,
in which the Supreme Court struck down, as
applied to a newspaper, a statute making it a
misdemeanor to "divulge information" about
confidential proceedings conducted by
Virginia's Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission, the Court observed that "the
Commonwealth has offered little more than
assertion and conjecture to support its claim
that without criminal sanctions the objectives
of the statutory scheme [which contemplated a
process of confidential inquiry into alleged
judicial misconduct] would be ' seriously
undermined." But the special -- and limited --
pertinence of the Court's observation becomes
clear when it is read in context. The full
paragraph follows:
It can be assumed for purposes of decision
that confidentiality of Commission proceedings
serves legitimate state interests. The question,
however, is whether these interests are
sufficient to justify the encroachment on First
Amendment guarantees which the imposition
of criminal sanctions entails with respect to
nonparticipants such as Landmark. The
Commonwealth has offered little more than
assertion and conjecture to support its claim
that without criminal sanctions the objectives
of the statutory scheme would be seriously
undermined. While not dispositive, we note
that more than 40 States having similar
commissions have not found it necessary to
enforce confidentiality by use of criminal
sanctions against nonparticipants.
In striking contrast is the legislative
landscape that forms the setting of the case at
bar. Complementing the federal statute are
more than forty state wiretapping statutes. Of
these state statutes, approximately half have
provisions which, like the federal statute, (1)
prohibit disclosure or use of an intercepted
conversation by one who knows or has "reason
to know" that the interception was unlawful,
and (2) authorize civil damage actions against
one who discloses or uses such unlawful
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interception. As this case illustrates,
Pennsylvania is one of those states. So are
Delaware and New Jersey -- Pennsylvania's
Third Circuit siblings. *
In short, there appears to be a widespread
legislative consensus that the imposition of civil
liability on persons engaged in conduct of the
kind attributed to these defendants is an
important ingredient of a regime designed to
protect the privacy of private conversations.
Moreover, the decision announced today not
only invalidates a portion of the federal statute
and the counterpart portion of the
Pennsylvania statute, it by necessary implication
spells the demise of a portion of more than
twenty other state statutes (and also of a statute
of the District of Columbia); in the two
centuries of our constitutional history there
cannot have been more than a handful of prior
decisions, either of a federal court or of a state
court, which, in the exercise of the awesome
power of judicial review, have cut so wide a
swath.
Third: What has been said points up the
non-pertinence to the case at bar of Schneider v.
State ***, Martin v. Struthers ***, and Village of
Schaumburg v. CitiZens for a Better Environment ***,
cases cited by the court as illustrative of the
proposition that regulations designed to
promote significant governmental interests
should not sweep so broadly as to impose
unnecessary constraints on First Amendment
rights of free expression and communication.
The constitutional shortcomings in Schneider
(combating the littering of streets by curbing
leafleting), Struthers (banning door-to-door
distribution of circulars, including religious
literature, in order to protect homeowners from
annoyance), and Village of Schaumburg
(combating allegedly fraudulent charitable
solicitation by banning all solicitation by groups
not disbursing 75% of receipts) involved
situations in which small towns imposed on
traditional First Amendment activities pervasive
constraints sought to be justified as ways of
dealing with distinct (and not very important)
problems that could have been more effectively
addressed by governmental action directed at
the actual problems -- e.g., prosecuting litterers
(Schneider); prosecuting as trespassers solicitors
who do not depart when requested by
homeowners to do so (Struthers); requiring
organizations soliciting contributions to
disclose how receipts are used (Village of
Schaumburg). In the case at bar, unauthorized
disclosure (or other use) of private
conversations is a central aspect of the very evil
the challenged statutory provisions are designed
to combat.
B.
The court also notes that "reporters often
will not know the precise origins of information
they receive from witnesses and other sources,
nor whether the information stems from a
lawful source," or, indeed, "whether material
they are considering publishing has previously
been disclosed to the public." *** As a result,
the court opines, "it is likely that in many
instances these [challenged statutory] provisions
will deter the media from publishing even
material that may lawfully be disclosed under
the Wiretapping Acts."
I think the court overstates the potential
problems of the media. One would suppose
that a responsible journalist -- whether press or
broadcast -- would be unlikely to propose
publication of a transcript of an apparently
newsworthy conversation without some effort
to insure that the conversation in fact took
place and to authenticate the identities of the
parties to the conversation. As part of such an
inquiry, the question whether the parties to the
conversation had authorized its recording and
release, or whether others had lawfully
intercepted the conversation, would seem
naturally to arise. Moreover, current technology
would make it relatively easy to determine
whether the conversation had been the subject
of a prior press or broadcast report. ***
214
II.
As the court's opinion makes plain, the
First Amendment values of free speech and
press are among the values most cherished in
the American social order. Maintenance of
these values (and the other values of the Bill of
Rights) against overreaching by the legislature
or the executive is among the judiciary's major
and most demanding responsibilities. In the
case at bar, however, the First Amendment
values on which defendants take their stand are
countered by privacy values sought to be
advanced by Congress and the Pennsylvania
General Assembly that are of comparable -
indeed kindred - dimension. Three decades ago
the late Chief Judge Fuld of the New York
Court of Appeals put the matter well in Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House *** (in words that
the Supreme Court has quoted with approval
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is
to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary
public expression of ideas; it shields the man
who wants to speak or publish when others
wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and
within suitably defined areas, a concomitant
freedom not to speak publicly, one which
serves the same ultimate end as freedom of
speech in its affirmative aspect.
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SUPREME COURT ROUNDUP: JUSTICES AGREE TO REVIEW
PRIVACY OF CELLULAR CALLS
The New York Times
Tuesday, June 27, 2000
Neil A. Lewis
The Supreme Court agreed today to decide
whether people, including journalists, may be
sued for disclosing the contents of telephone
calls that were illegally intercepted and recorded
by someone else.
The court accepted a case from
Pennsylvania that is expected to help define the
balance between the First Amendment rights of
Americans to disseminate information, and
state and federal wiretapping laws intended to
prevent people from intercepting private
conversations.
The Pennsylvania case involved a tape
recording made illegally of a cell phone
conversation that was later given to a radio
station, which broadcast it repeatedly. The case
is likely to affect a similar lawsuit brought by a
Republican leader in the House against a
Democratic colleague for disclosing a taped cell
phone conversation among Republican leaders
about the House ethics investigation of former
Speaker Newt Gingrich.
The court's decision to hear the case was
one of many actions today as the justices
moved to conclude their term this week. The
court also agreed to revisit a North Carolina
case to see if race played too large a role in how
a Congressional district was created.
The wiretap case involved heated contract
negotiations between the teachers union and
the school board in the Wyoming Valley West
School District. A teacher who was president of
the union was talking on her cell phone with
the union's chief negotiator and said angrily that
if school board members did not budge from
their offer, the teachers were going to "blow off
the front porches" of their homes. An
opponent of the teachers union said he found a
tape recording of the conversation in his
mailbox and gave it to a radio station, which
eventually broadcast it.
Neither the teachers' opponent nor the
radio station was involved in intercepting or
taping the conversation, according to the
record. The federal appeals court in
Philadelphia ruled 2 to 1 that wiretapping laws
could not be extended to the defendants
because that would violate constitutional
guarantees of free speech. The outcome will
have particular significance for news
organizations and will almost certainly bear on
a lawsuit brought by Representative John A.
Boehner, Republican of Ohio, against
Representative Jim McDermott, Democrat of
Washington.
In December 1996, a Florida couple illegally
taped a cell phone conversation in which Mr.
Gingrich, Mr. Boehner and other Republican
leaders were heard discussing matters related to
Mr. Gingrich's ethics case. The couple gave the
tape to Mr. McDermott, who passed it on to
the House ethics committee. The New York
Times and several other news organizations
published transcripts of the conversations. An
appeals court in the District of Columbia had
ruled 2 to 1 that the Boehner suit could go
forward.
The Pennsylvania cases are Bartnicki v.
Vopper (99-1687) and United States v. Vopper
(99-1728).
In other matters, the court dealt with these
cases:
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Traffic Stop
The court also agreed to hear the appeal of
a Texas woman who was arrested, handcuffed
and jailed because she and her two children did
not use seat belts.
The case involves the reach of Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure by the police. Lawyers for
the Texas woman, Gail Atwater, argued that the
traffic stops are the most frequent experience
Americans have with the Fourth Amendment
as there are 185 million licensed drivers.
Ms. Atwater was driving her two children
home one afternoon in 1997 when her truck
was stopped by Bart Turek, then a Lago Vista,
Tex., police officer, because no one had the
seat belt fastened.
Texas law gives police the discretion to
make arrests for routine traffic violations,
except for speeding. Mr. Turek arrested Ms.
Atwater, handcuffed her and took her to the
police station. She was booked and placed in a
cell for about an hour before she appeared
before a magistrate and paid a $50 fine, the
maximum penalty for the offense.
The case is Atwater v. Lago Vista (99-1408).
Redistricting
The court agreed to consider once again
how much the issue of race may be used in
drawing lines for a Congressional district.
The case involves the 12th District in
North Carolina, which has been represented
since 1992 by Melvin Watt, a Democrat.
After the Supreme Court ruled that the
1992 boundaries were so extraordinary as to be
unconstitutional, the district was redrawn in
1997. This time, the General Assembly tried to
avoid some of the odd features that attracted
the court, like the way the district jumped back
and forth across a highway to take in more
black voters.
Nonetheless, the new plan was challenged
as relying too heavily on race, and a three-judge
appeals court agreed, saying District 12
remained "an impermissible and
unconstitutional racial gerrymander."
The cases are Hunt vs. Cromartie (99-1864)
and Smallwood vs. Cromartie (99-1865).
School Prayer
The court set aside an appeals court ruling
that let public school students in an Alabama
county lead group prayers at graduations,
assemblies and sports events.
The justices told a federal appeals court in
Atlanta to restudy the case in light of a school-
prayer decision announced last week in a Texas
case. In that ruling, the court said prayer in
public schools must be private and that such
prayers at high school football games violated
the separation of church and state.
In 1993, Alabama enacted a law requiring
public schools to allow student-initiated prayer
at "compulsory or noncompulsory" school
activities.
The case is Michael Chandler v. Siegelman
(99-935).
License to Practice Law
The court rejected the appeal of a white
supremacist in Illinois who said the state
committee that denied him a law license
violated his free-speech rights. The court
rejected Matthew Hale's arguments that Illinois
had used "orthodox religious and political
beliefs to which (an aspiring lawyer) must
subscribe as a condition of admission."
Mr. Hale, of East Peoria, a leader of the
segregationist World Church of the Creator,
was denied a law license last summer, even
though he graduated from Southern Illinois
University's law school and passed the state bar
exam. State bar officials noted that he had
"dedicated his life to inciting racial hatred," and
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said that "he cannot do this as an officer of the
court."
The case is Hale v. Committee on Character
and Fitness (99-1349).
Assistance to Counsel
The Supreme Court agreed to consider
when a criminal defense lawyer's failure to
challenge a sentencing error should result in a
ruling that the defendant did not have adequate
legal representation.
The case involves Paul L. Glover, former
vice president and general counsel of Chicago
Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse
Workers Union, who was convicted of
racketeering and conspiracy charges. Mr.
Glover has argued that he is entitled to a new
sentencing hearing because his lawyer failed to
challenge a sentence that was up to 21 months
longer than he should have received.
The case is Glover v. U.S. (99-8576).
Copyright C 2000 The New York Times
Company
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FREE SPEECH AND WIRELESS PRIVACY FACE OFF
Radio Comm. Report
Monday, July 3,2000
Jeffrey Silva
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court last
week agreed to decide whether individuals who
divulge illegally intercepted electronic
communications are as liable as eavesdroppers
themselves, setting a showdown between free
speech and wireless privacy.
The case has major implications for the
wireless industry, which has aggressively fought
in recent years for stronger privacy laws for the
nation's 90 million mobile phone subscribers. A
decision that favors free speech over telephone
privacy would be a severe blow to wireless
security.
The Supreme Court will review a decision
made last December by a federal appeals court
in Philadelphia, which rejected as
unconstitutional federal and Pennsylvania
wiretap laws.
The case was brought by Gloria Bartnicki, a
Pennsylvania teacher's union negotiator whose
conversation from her cell phone was
intercepted, recorded and aired on a local radio
talk show in September 1993. Both Bartnicki
and the Clinton administration sought a review
by the high court.
While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled against Bartnicki, saying the radio station
that aired the intercepted telephone
conversation was protected by the First
Amendment, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit came to a
markedly different conclusion in a politically
high-profile eavesdropping case pitting Rep.
John Boehner (R-Ohio) against Rep. James
McDermott (D-Wash.).
In that litigation, the appeals court here
overturned a federal district court ruling that
threw out Boehner's 1998 suit against
McDermott. Boehner's suit is seeking $10,000
in statutory damages.
In April, McDermott asked the Supreme
Court to review the case.
Boehner, then-chairman of the House
Republican Conference, claimed McDermott
gave several major newspapers audio tapes of a
December 1996 conference call among several
GOP House leaders about how to deal in
public with an expected settlement between
then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.)
and the House Ethics Committee over alleged
misconduct.
The GOP conference call, in which
Boehner participated in via his cell phone while
vacationing in northern Florida, was overheard
and recorded by a Florida couple. John and
Alice Martin gave the taped GOP conference
call to Rep. Karen Thurman (D-Fla.) and
discussed with her the prospect of getting
immunity from illegally intercepting the call.
Thurman pointed the Martins to
McDermott, who at the time sat on the House
Ethics Committee that was investigating
Gingrich. McDermott later stepped down from
the panel. In 1997, the Martins pled guilty, and
each paid a $500 fine.
"I think it will have a big impact," said
Christopher Landau, a lawyer for McDermott,
referring to the Supreme Court's decision to
review the Pennsylvania mobile phone privacy
case.
The Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association and Boehner's office did not return
calls for comment.
Copyright ( 2000 Crain Communications,
Inc.
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LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION v. VELAZQUEZ
&
UNITED STATES v. VELAZQUEZ
Limiting Legal Aid
Meredith Lugo*
How far can attorneys receiving federal funds go in representing indigent clients seeking welfare
benefits? Only as far as the government permits, says the government, but attorneys contend that's not
far enough, particularly at a time when states are experimenting with aggressive welfare reform. The
Supreme Court will get its say later this year when it hears the Velaggue:Z case, the latest consideration of
the question of the government's ability to limit the way in which its monies are spent.
The federal government created the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1974 to help finance
legal assistance for the poor in noncriminal matters. Since its inception, the government has limited
LSC's scope. This latest challenge by LSC grantees and their clients is in response to the Congressional
expansion, in 1996, of restrictions placed on the Corporation. Congress forbade participating attorneys
from lobbying, participating in class actions, providing legal assistance to aliens in certain categories,
supporting advocacy training, litigating on behalf of prisoners, and, most importantly for the purposes
of this case, seeking to reform welfare. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld all of the regulations except that which prohibited attorneys from participating in lobbying or
rulemaking involving an effort to reform a state or Federal welfare system and permitted them to
represent clients seeking welfare benefits only so long as such an effort did not involve an attempt to
reform or challenge the existing welfare system. The Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals filed by
both the United States and the LSC challenging the Second Circuit's 2-1 holding striking down this
provision as impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
In his majority opinion, Judge Pierre Leval emphasized that legal advocacy is closely akin to the
most protected categories of speech under the First Amendment. His decision was based largely on the
contention that the courtroom constitutes a forum, or marketplace, uniquely suited for the airing of
challenges to governmental action. With the regulation at issue, the government has decided what
arguments are acceptable and attempted to exclude all other viewpoints. The restriction serves as an
"absolute prohibition ... muzzl[ing] grant recipients from expressing any and all forbidden arguments."
This, the majority held, the government cannot do.
Judge Dennis Jacobs in dissent sharply criticized the majority for ignoring Rust v. Sullivan, a 1991
Supreme Court decision which he maintained was controlling. By a 6-3 decision, the majority in Rust
upheld a prohibition on abortion counseling by clinics receiving Title X funds. Judge Leval's majority
opinion had quickly dispensed with Rust by distinguishing legal advocacy as entitled to greater First
Amendment protection than abortion counseling. Judge Jacobs disputed this distinction, and held that
the statute as a whole, including the provision struck by the majority, is constitutional because Congress
may set parameters for the programs which it funds. He also rejected the majority's description of the
courtroom as a public forum, and characterized LSC grantees as contractors whose actions the
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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government may prescribe because it is footing the bill for their services. He quoted at length from the
majority in Rust to support his conclusions: "The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without
at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.
In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."
The Supreme Court is also likely to rely on Rust for guidance when it decides Velagqueg this
term. Whatever the outcome, this decision is sure to have a great impact upon legal representation of
the poor.
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99-603 Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez
Ruling below (2d Cir., 164 F.3d 757, 67 U.S.L.W. 1404):
Federal statute that bars Legal Services Corporation grantees from challenging existing law in
representing individual welfare claimants discriminates on basis of viewpoint in seeking to discourage
challenges to status quo and thus violates First Amendment's free speech clause.
Question presented: Did court of appeals err in refusing to follow Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990),
when it invalidated limitation imposed by Congress on services that may be provided by Legal Services
Corporation grantees and held that Congress must subsidize grantees involved in litigation that seeks to
amend or otherwise challenges existing welfare laws?
99-960 United States v. Velazquez
Ruling below ( Velagque v. Legal Services Corporation, 2d Cir., 164 F.3d 757, 67 U.S.L.W. 1404):
Statutory restrictions on activities of recipients of Legal Services Corporation funds and LSC
regulations requiring that groups engaging in prohibited activities be separate from LSC fund recipients
do not violate First Amendment, except for statutory provision barring LSC grantees from challenging
existing law in representing individual welfare claimants.
Question presented: Does Section 504(a)(16) of 1996 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act, which precludes recipients of LSC funds from participating in "litigation, lobbying,
or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system," except that it allows
representation of "an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if
such relief does not involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the date
of the initiation of the representation," violate First Amendment?
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CAREEN VELAZQUEZ, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants
V.
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Decided January 7, 1999
LEVAL, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns the validity of
restrictions imposed by Congress and the Legal
Services Corporation ("LSC") on the
professional activities of entities that receive
funding from LSC ("LSC grantees"). Plaintiffs
are lawyers employed by New York City LSC
grantees, their indigent clients, private
contributors to LSC grantees, and state and
local public officials whose governments
contribute to LSC grantees. Plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of the restrictions, contending they violate
various provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
The district court denied a preliminary
injunction, finding that plaintiffs had failed to
establish a probability of success on the merits.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Background
A. The Legal Services Corporation and the
Challenged Statute.
LSC is a non-profit government-funded
corporation, created by the Legal Services
Corporation Act of 1974 ("LSCA")***, "for the
purpose of providing financial support for legal
assistance in noncriminal proceedings or
matters to persons financially unable to afford
legal assistance." *** LSC fulfills this mandate
by making and administering grants to
hundreds of local organizations that in turn
provide free legal assistance to between
1,000,000 and 2,000,000 indigent clients
annually. *** Many LSC grantees are funded by
a combination of LSC funds and other public
or private sources. *** LSC grantees are
governed by local Boards of Directors who set
policies and priorities in response to local
conditions and client needs. LSC is empowered
to implement the LSCA through the traditional
administrative rulemaking process. ***
From the outset of the LSC program, LSC
grantees have been restricted in the use of LSC
funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1)-(10)
(prohibiting use of LSC funds in, inter alia,
most criminal proceedings, political activities,
and litigation involving nontherapeutic
abortion, desegregation, or military desertion).
Recipient organizations are also barred from
using most nonfederal funds for any activity
proscribed by the LSCA.
In 1996, Congress substantially expanded
the restrictions on activities of LSC grantees.
See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996 *** ("OCRAA," or
"the 1996 Act"), reenacted in the Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1997 ***. Section 504 of OCRAA ***
bars the use of LSC funds to aid entities that
perform various activities including lobbying,
participation in class actions, providing legal
assistance to aliens in certain categones,
supporting advocacy training programs,
collecting attorneys' fees under fee shifting
laws, litigating on behalf of prisoners, and
seeking to reform welfare.
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Congress left no question of its intention
to restrict grantees' use of non-federal and
federal funds alike. *
3. Viewpoint Discrimination.
We turn finally to plaintiffs' claim that the
1996 Act discriminates against certain speech
on the basis of viewpoint and is therefore
unconstitutional even as applied to the use of
federal monies. It appears that plaintiffs direct
this argument against the lobbying provisions
and the welfare reform provision of the Act.
The welfare reform provision of §
504(a)(16) is more obscure. It includes four
categories of prohibited activities "involving an
effort to reform a Federal or State welfare
system" -- initiating legal representation, and
participating in litigation, lobbying, or
rulemaking -- with an exception relating to the
legal representation or litigation prohibitions.
Under the most natural reading of each of these
provisions, three appear to prohibit the type of
activity named regardless of viewpoint, while
one might be read to prohibit the activity only
when it seeks reform.
Subsection (a)(16) expressly provides that
its prohibitions do not prevent a grantee from
representing "an eligible client who is seeking
specific relief from a welfare agency if such
relief does not involve an effort to amend or
otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the
date of the initiation of the representation" (the
"suit-for-benefits exception"). According to this
exception, representation of a client seeking a
welfare benefit is permitted, but only if the
representation will not involve any challenge to
the propriety of any previously existing rule that
led to the denial of benefits. The grantee thus
could not argue that the rule that led to the
denial of the client's benefits was unauthorized
by the governing regulation, that the regulation
was unauthorized by the statute, or that the
regulation or statute was unauthorized by the
Constitution. Such representation is permitted
only if it includes no challenge to the underlying
law. It seems clear to us that this limitation on
the suit-for-benefits exception is not viewpoint
neutral. It accords funding to those who
represent clients without making any challenge
to existing rules of law, but denies it to those
whose representation challenges existing rules.
It clearly seeks to discourage challenges to the
status quo. The provision thus discriminates on
the basis of viewpoint, and requires us to
decide whether this discrimination is
permissible in the context of the LSCA.
The government's "discrimination against
speech because of its message" is suspect under
the First Amendment. Rosenberger v. Rector and
Viitors of University of Viginia, *** (noting that
such discrimination is "presumed to be
unconstitutional"). Whether a subsidy that is
dependent on viewpoint constitutes illegal
discrimination presents a complex question,
which is illuminated by three relevant recent
Supreme Court holdings.
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld
regulations forbidding recipients of government
funds for family planning from counseling or
advocacy related to abortion. ***
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
the Court last term upheld a requirement that
the NEA, in making grants for the arts based
on excellence, also "take into consideration
general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American
people." ***
In Rosenbeqer, the Court struck down a
provision in a program of governmental grants
to support student publications that excluded
from eligibility publications expressing a
viewpoint on religion.
We assess the relevance of these precedents
differently from our dissenting colleague. Judge
Jacobs argues that Rust and Finley together
224
establish the government's broad entitlement to
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in
making financial grants. Viewpoint
discrimination, he argues, is suspect only where,
as in Rosenberger, the government seeks to
promote a diversity of private speech. Judge
Jacobs relies heavily on explanatory language in
the Rust opinion, which was quoted by the
Supreme Court in Finley.
The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program ... it
believes to be in the public interest, without at
the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in
another way. In so doing, the Government has
not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it
has merely chosen to fund one activity to the
exclusion of the other. ***
Under Judge Jacobs's analysis, just as
Congress may lawfully fund family planning
services conditioned on the grantee's not
counseling on the availability of abortion, so
Congress also may fund the legal representation
of a welfare applicant conditioned on the
grantee's not raising arguments that question
the validity of any statute, regulation or
governmental procedure pertaining to welfare.
We acknowledge that the words from Rust
that Judge Jacobs cites seem on their face to
support his view. But we doubt that these
words can reliably be taken at face value. In
seeking to understand how a judicial precedent
in a relatively unexplored area of law bears on
other undecided questions, it is often more
instructive to look at what the Court has done,
rather than at what the Court has said in
explanation. Explanations that seem sound
enough in the context of the facts for which
they are devised often carry implications the
court would never subscribe to if applied to
other facts not in contemplation. ***
The quotation from Rust, for example,
seems on its face to imply that Congress could
lawfully fund institutions to study the nation's
foreign or domestic policies, conditioned on the
grantee's not criticizing, or advocating change
in, the policies of the government. That would
fall within the parameters of choosing "to fund
one activity to the exclusion of another."
Congress would be "selectively funding a
program . . . it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with
the problem in another way." Nonetheless, we
think it inconceivable that the Supreme Court
that approved the Rust regulation would have
intended its language to authorize grants
funding support for, but barring criticism of,
governmental policy. ***
We think the resolution lies in the fact that
different types of speech enjoy different
degrees of protection under the First
Amendment. "Expression on public issues 'has
always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values."'
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. *** The
strongest protection of the First Amendment's
free speech guarantee goes to the right to
criticism government or advocate change in
governmental policy. "Expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of this country
[is] situated at the core of our First Amendment
values." Texas v. Johnson ***. Criticism of official
policy is the kind of speech that an oppressive
government would be most keen to suppress. It
is also speech for which liberty must be
preserved to guarantee freedom of political
choice to the people. For those reasons we
think it clear that, notwithstanding Rus/s
semantic endorsement of Congress's right to
fund one activity to the exclusion of another,
the Supreme Court would not approve a grant
to study governmental policy, conditioned on
the grantee's not criticizing the policy.
In our view, a lawyer's argument to a court
that a statute, rule, or governmental practice
standing in the way of a client's claim is
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal falls far
closer to the First Amendment's most
protected categories of speech than abortion
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counseling or indecent art. The fact that
Congress can make grants that favor family
planning over abortion, or that favor decency
over indecency, in no way suggests that
Congress may also make grants to fund the
legal representation of welfare applicants under
terms that bar the attorney from arguing the
unconstitutionality or illegality of whatever rule
blocks the client's success. Among the only
directly effective ways to oppose a statute,
regulation or policy adopted by government is
to argue to a court having jurisdiction of the
matter that the rule is either unconstitutional or
unauthorized by law. The limitation on the suit-
for-benefits exception prohibits a legal services
organization that has received LSC grant funds
from making such an argument on behalf of a
client, even though that argument may be
necessary to establish the client's rights in
precisely the representation for which the
funding was granted. Such a restriction is a
close kin to those "calculated to drive 'certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'
Finley ***. If the idea in question is the
unconstitutionality or illegality of a
governmental rule, the courtroom is the prime
marketplace for the exposure of that idea. ***
To forbid a lawyer from articulating that idea in
the court proceeding effectively drives the idea
from the marketplace where it can most
effectively be offered.
The Supreme Court's discussion in Finley
underscores the suspect nature of the limitation
on the suits-for-benefits exception for a further
reason. In Finley, considerations of "decency
and respect" were merely to be taken "into
consideration." The Supreme Court stressed
that the questioned provision offered "vague
exhortations" and "imposed no categorical
requirement." *** The NEA might still make
grants notwithstanding indecency. The Court,
in fact, seemed to imply that an absolute
prohibition, of the sort "calculated to drive
'certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace,"' would have required a different
result. *** The limitation on the suit-for-
benefits exception is just such an absolute
prohibition: It muzzles grant recipients from
expressing any and all forbidden arguments.
For these reasons, we believe that the suit-
for-benefits exception is viewpoint
discrimination subject to strict First
Amendment scrutiny. Defendants offer no
arguments why the provision can survive such
scrutiny and we perceive none. We therefore
conclude that the suit-for-benefits exception of
§ 504(a)(16) unconstitutionally restricts freedom
of speech, insofar as it restricts a grantee,
seeking relief for a welfare applicant, from
challenging existing law.
The next question is which part of the
statute should be found invalid as a result of the
unconstitutionality of the viewpoint-based
proviso to the suit-for-benefits exception.
We *** conclude that the viewpoint-based
proviso barring grantee lawyers representing
individuals from contesting the legality of an
existing rule is severable from the overall suit-
for-benefits exception. The exception
permitting a grantee to "represent[] an
individual eligible client who is seeking specific
relief from a welfare agency" will survive our
holding that the viewpoint-based proviso to the
suit-for-benefits exception is unconstitutional.
We therefore direct the district court to
enter a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of that part of the suit-for-benefits
exception of § 504(a)(16) that would make an
entity ineligible for an LSC grant if, in the
course of a representation of an individual
client seeking specific relief from a welfare
agency, that entity sought "to amend or
otherwise challenge existing law in effect on the
date of the initiation of the representation." In
all other respects, the statute will continue to
function as written. Grantees will be barred (on
penalty of losing their entitlement to grantee
status) from engaging in any of the activities
prohibited by § 504. They will be prohibited
under § 504(a)(16) from initiating legal
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representation, or participating in any other way
in litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking
concerning "efforts [by anyone] to reform a
Federal or State welfare system." On the other
hand, grantees will be permitted to represent
"an individual eligible client who is seeking
specific relief from a welfare agency," regardless
whether such representation includes
arguments that seek "to amend or otherwise
challenge existing law." § 504(a)(16).
Conclusion
The district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction is reversed solely with respect to the
limitation on the suit-for-benefits exception of
§ 504(a)(16). In all other respects, the district
court's order denying a preliminary injunction is
affirmed.
JACOBS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part,
dissenting in part:
I agree with the conclusions of the majority
opinion except insofar as it holds
unconstitutional a critical proviso in a
subsection of the Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996
("OCRAA") *** The majority throws the
section out of kilter by preserving the exception
but striking the proviso, on the ground that
under Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Universily of Virginia the proviso amounts to
viewpoint discrimination.
I respectfully dissent because:
(A) The proviso, which helps specify the
type of representation that a grant recipient
may undertake, is part of Congress's entirely
appropriate--and necessary--specification of the
services available in a program it created.
(B) The majority has not successfully
identified a disfavored viewpoint of any person
in any public forum. To the extent that this
legislation funds a "viewpoint" at all, it is one
that advocates the delivery of welfare benefits
to claimants.
A. Program Definition
In creating a government program, Congress
can of course specify the goods and services
that will be provided and the goods and
services that will be excluded. In so doing,
Congress is permitted to fund the exercise of
some constitutionally protected rights, but not
others. See Rust v. Sullivan. Although Rosenberger
curbs the government's power to fund some
viewpoints to the exclusion of others, that
limitation operates only when the government
creates a limited public forum for the
expression of diverse viewpoints. A grantee of
the Legal Services Corporation is not a public
forum or the participant in a public forum in
which it is invited to contribute its point of
view; it is a contractor furnishing services that
the government wants provided, and in that
way it resembles the recipients of Title X funds
in Rust, and any of the private agencies that
carry out myriad other government programs
that have limited and specified purposes.
1. Statutory Authority
From its inception, the purpose of the LSC
has been to fund individual client services for
indigent persons with legal problems. *** Over
the years, Congress has shaped and clarified the
kind of legal services that LSC and, in some
cases, its grant recipients may fund. *** The
majority opinion correctly rejects the
copstitutional challenges that the plaintiffs
make to several of these program-shaping
provisions. ***
The restriction that § 504(a)(16) imposes--
on the use of LSC money to fund political
agitation concerning welfare policy--is another
effort by Congress to define the types of
services that LSC grantees may provide and to
channel all the government's funds (without
substitution or displacement) to those services
and no others. The exception for advocacy in
suits to collect welfare benefits, as limited by
the proviso barring expenditures to challenge
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existing law, serves the same purpose and
operates in the same way.
The proviso on welfare litigation is not (as
the majority appears to believe) an effort to
weed out a certain class of arguments in cases
in which LSC-funded lawyers appear. The
statute nowhere contemplates or requires that
an LSC-funded lawyer appear in a case in which
he or she must forbear from challenging a
welfare statute on meritorious constitutional
grounds; to the contrary, the proviso says that a
lawyer or grantee may not take on such a
representation in the first place. There is
nothing remarkable about this. Lawyers often
turn down representations that they cannot
fulfill, either by reason of conflict or otherwise
(such as availability of time and resources, or
lack of expertise). *** The LSC's authorizing
legislation as well as rules of legal ethics
prohibit a lawyer from undertaking a
representation in which that lawyer would be
barred from pursuing a potentially fruitful
avenue of argument. A grantee (or a lawyer
employed by a grantee) is ethically obliged to
decline such a case, and may refer the client to a
lawyer who can handle it, *** and in some
instances, the client will be referred to an
affiliated entity ***.
The majority argues that as a "practical
matter" an attorney will "often" not know what
arguments may be needed in a given
representation. *** Since this is a facial
challenge, however, this Court may not base its
invalidation of this statute on a hypothetical set
of circumstances, even one it believes will
"often" occur. *** Moreover, as the majority
points out, the LSC does not fund a traditional,
all-encompassing lawyer-client relationship. It
has always operated under significant
restrictions, and it is required to advise
prospective clients of these limitations. So there
is therefore "no reason to fear that clients will
detrimentally rely on their LSC lawyers for a
full range of legal services," *** such as help in
mounting a Constitutional challenge to a
welfare statute.
2. Supreme Court Authority
On its face, this statute funds a program
that provides certain services, and the
restriction found in 5 04(a)(1 6) (together with
its exception and its proviso) prohibits grantees
from rendering services that fall outside the
scope of the program. The Supreme Court has
recognized the undoubted power of Congress
to do this. See Rust, Harns v. McRae.
In Rust, the Court considered a section of
the Public Health Service Act prohibiting the
use of funds appropriated for family-planning
services "in programs where abortion is a
method of family planning." *** The Court
upheld the constitutionality of that prohibition
because it ensured that grantees did not engage
in activities outside the scope of the program:
The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to
deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other. ***
The program definition upheld in Rust is
therefore "not the case of a general law singling
out a disfavored group on the basis of speech
content, but a case of the Government refusing
to fund activities, including speech, which are
specifically excluded from the scope of the
project funded." *** Of the present case it is
possible to say in paraphrase of Rust that the
scope of the LSC project is the funding of
certain individual client services, that the law
does not single out any "disfavored group," and
that the government has simply "refused to
fund activities, including speech, which are
specifically excluded from the scope of the
project funded."
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The error of the majority opinion anses
from its inapt (and complete) reliance on
Rosenbeqer, a case in which the purpose of the
government program was to fund the
expression of politically diverse views. The
University of Virginia was defraying part of the
printing costs of student publications, but
denied funding to journals that promoted a
religious viewpoint. The Supreme Court held
that such content-based funding decisions are
impermissible when the expenditure of funds is
intended to facilitate private speech and thus to
"encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers." The holding of Rosenbeger is that
when government subsidizes private speakers
to express their own viewpoints, it cannot
discriminate among potential recipients on the
basis of viewpoint. The LSC, which supports a
defined program of legal representation to
indigent clients, of course does not underwrite
the expression of the private speech or
viewpoints of its grantees or their lawyers, or
(for that matter) their clients.
Rosenberger does not impair the principle--
explicitly announced in Rust and not implicated
by the facts of Rosenbeqer--that when the
government funds specific services it deems to
be in the public interest, it may require grantees
to get with its program. The majority's
surprising, short answer to this argument is that
the passage from Rust on which I rely cannot
"reliably be taken at face value." *** This
approach to Supreme Court opinions is not one
previously employed in this Circuit. I think the
Supreme Court meant what it said, and that it
bears repeating:
The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to
deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other. ***
Recently the Supreme Court itself invoked Rust-
-and quoted that passage-- to uphold
restrictions on the disbursement of funds by
the National Endowment for the Arts. See
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley ***.
There is one sure fire way to find out
whether the Supreme Court meant what it said
in Rust and Finley, and now that the majority has
split with the Ninth Circuit on this issue, we
may not have long to wait. Relying on Rust, the
Ninth Circuit rejected a viewpoint
discrimination challenge to the LSC restrictions
that are at issue on this appeal. *** Justice
White (part of the Rust majority), sitting by
designation on the Ninth Circuit, wrote: "Like
the Title X program in Rust, the LSC program
is designed to provide professional services of
limited scope to indigent persons, not create a
forum for the free expression of ideas." ***
In an attempt to distinguish the Rust
opinion from the Rust result, the majority offers
the hypothetical of government-financed think
tanks commissioned to study American foreign
policy, but forbidden to criticize it. This
hypothetical is far removed from any program
to furnish legal services; tellingly, it looks very
much like the University of Virginia's student-
publication program in Rosenbeger.
A closer analogy would be presented if
Congress (i) decided to out-source the advice
that the Internal Revenue Service now gives
taxpayers on how much taxes they owe and
how much they can shelter or deduct, (ii)
underwrote accountants and tax lawyers to
counsel and represent qualifying middle-class
taxpayers, and then (iii) discovered that the
outside contractors were expending appreciable
grant resources on agitation for tax reform
along lines favored by the contractors and
deemed by them to be in the interest of the
middle classes. Congress could certainly plug
that drain by specifying that the representation
be limited to achieving the accurate
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computation of amounts due under the present
tax code, and by barring advocacy aimed at,
inter alia, tax reform, establishing the single tax
or flat tax, or organizing constitutional litigation
to challenge particular revenue provisions or
the ratification of the 16 h Amendment.
Congress could do this, and if it did, the
legislation would look like the restriction that
the majority here holds unconstitutional.
The LSC restrictions, like my hypothetical
statute to assist taxpayers, is not a promotion of
advocacy for the good old status quo, or a
suppression of a point of view. Both programs
channel money to an identified public purpose,
which is the administration of a complex
existing statute so that everyone can get what
the statute provides. I cannot imagine a more
viewpoint-neutral legislative scheme.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination
Considering that the majority has
invalidated a statute on the ground that it
constitutes impermissible viewpoint
discrimination, it is odd that the majority only
vaguely articulates the viewpoint that is
supposedly disfavored by this legislation and
(reciprocally) never states what viewpoint is
favored. The fact is, the LSC subject-matter
restrictions do not lend themselves to analysis
in these terms. *** If limitations on classes of
cases eligible for representation by LSC-
financed lawyers constitute impermissible
discrimination against the people who may
want to advance theories in such cases, then it
is hard to see how any of the many statutory
limitations on LSC funds are constitutional.
By the same token, I cannot agree that the
statute promotes one favored view over others
in a supposed public forum. Whose viewpoint?
What forum? According to the majority
opinion: the government-funded lawyers
possess the protected expressive interest; and
the public forum is the courtroom (an idea that
may come as a surprise to trial judges). *** But
the proviso stricken by the majority bars
representation in lawsuits. The viewpoints of
litigating lawyers in a courtroom cannot matter
for present purposes, because (among other
things) the advocacy of a lawyer in litigation is
at the service of the client; it would be
inaccurate (and unfair) to assume that a lawyer's
advocacy expresses that lawyer's personal view
on politics or morals. ***
It also cannot be said that the proviso
disfavors the speech of the clients; the only
litigants who are funded are those who seek
benefits. There are certainly people on the
other side of welfare issues, such as those who
favor narrowing welfare eligibility, or reduced
benefits, or abolition of the welfare system. But
the statute gives them nothing. Where then is
the viewpoint discrimination, even if one
assumed (as I do not) that the LSC makes every
courtroom into a public forum?
The statute bars constitutional and other
challenges to the welfare laws, but it certainly
does not fund the view that the welfare laws are
constitutionally impregnable. The proviso
invalidated by the majority does not promote or
favor any message. It lays down specifications
for services to be provided to favored
beneficiaries. And it excludes some of the most
expensive services--constitutional litigation and
statutory challenges--in the same way that the
statute elsewhere bars the expenditure of LSC
funds for class actions. In excluding these
expensive initiatives, the statute maximizes the
expenditure of limited available funds for less
expensive benefit-collection lawsuits. ***
Congress is able to do that; and a statute in
which Congress does that should be able to
withstand a facial challenge.
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HIGH COURT WILL CONSIDER LIMITS OF LEGAL AID TO POOR
The Washington Post
Tuesday, April 4. 2000
Joan Biskupic
In a case that thrusts the Supreme Court
into the perennial controversy over legal aid for
the poor, justices agreed yesterday to decide
whether Congress can prohibit federally funded
lawyers from challenging welfare laws on behalf
of their indigent clients.
The court agreed to review a ruling that the
restriction on lawyers funded by the Legal
Services Corporation discriminates against
particular viewpoints and violates the First
Amendment.
The appeal will be an important test of
what strings government may attach to its
funds in an array of programs. But it will
particularly affect the federally financed legal
services program, which has been frequently
attacked in Congress for pursuing "liberal
causes" and repeatedly subject to restrictions on
what kinds of cases its lawyers can take.
Established in 1974, the nonprofit
corporation was designed to help the poor with
basic legal problems by providing grants and
other assistance to local legal aid offices. From
the outset, Congress restricted the kinds of
advocacy that would be financed, prohibiting
LSC lawyers from working on cases related to
abortion, school desegregation or military
desertion.
The condition at issue in the new dispute
allows LSC lawyers to seek welfare benefits for
individual clients but bars litigation that aims to
change federal or state welfare law. It was
adopted in 1996, along with restrictions on
class action lawsuits, claims for lawyers' fees,
and the representation of prisoners and certain
unnugrants.
Lawyers for a New York woman who
sought legal aid after her welfare benefits were
cut say the new restriction "is particularly
damaging in this era of welfare reform ... [as]
states are experimenting with a wide range of
welfare responses--some of them far more
punitive and arbitrary than Congress could have
contemplated."
The lawyers, who are affiliated with New
York University's Brennan Center for Justice,
claim the provision unconstitutionally bars
attorneys for the poor from questioning the
legality of new welfare regulations.
In its decision siding with the challengers,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit said the regulation allowing LSC lawyers
to bring individual welfare claims but not to
challenge the welfare laws discriminates against
certain points of view.
"It accords funding to those who represent
clients without making any challenge to existing
rules of law, but denies it to those whose
representation challenges existing rules," the
appeals court said. "It clearly seeks to
discourage challenges to the status quo."
The Legal Services Corp. and the Justice
Department, which intervened on behalf of the
Clinton administration, contend the welfare-
related rules are permitted under a 1991 high
court ruling that gave Congress considerable
latitude to define the limits of programs it
funds. In that 5-to-4 decision, the court upheld
a restriction on the discussion of abortion by
doctors who worked in a government-financed
health clinic.
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Legal Services Corp. lawyers say that
decision in Rust v. Sullivan allows Congress to
choose whether to subsidize various points of
view without violating the First Amendment.
The Justice Department, in a separate appeal,
asserted that Congress could choose to pay for
lawsuits in which poor people seek benefits
under the law, but not lawsuits that would
undermine the law.
The consolidated cases of Legal Services
Corp. v. Velazquez and United States v.
Velazquez will be heard during the term that
begins in October.
Copyright 0 2000 The Washington Post
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SUPREME COURT ROUNDUP: WEIGHING RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL AID FOR
POOR
The New York Times
Tuesday, April 4,2000
Linda Greenhouse
The highly charged question of what strings
the government can attach to the use of federal
money reached the Supreme Court again today,
this time in the context of legal services for the
poor.
The court agreed to decide whether
Congress had violated the First Amendment
when it restricted the type of arguments that
lawyers supported by the federal Legal Services
Corporation can make on behalf of clients
seeking welfare benefits. Under the restriction,
the lawyers can help clients who are seeking to
receive or restore specific welfare benefits, but
may not become involved in "an effort to
amend or otherwise challenge existing law."
The federal appeals court in New York
ruled last year that because the provision, first
imposed on the agency in 1996, "clearly seeks
to discourage challenges to the status quo," it
amounted to "viewpoint discrimination" that
the First Amendment makes impermissible.
"The strongest protection of the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee goes to the
right to criticize government or advocate
change in government policy," Judge Pierre N.
Leval said in his majority opinion for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, adding that criticism of the government
"is also speech for which liberty must be
preserved to guarantee freedom of political
choice to the people."
The welfare restriction that the court will
review was adopted as part of an appropriations
bill during a contentious election-year
Congressional session in which opponents of
the Legal Services Corporation came close to
eliminating financing for the program
altogether.
As a compromise, the corporation accepted
a long list of restrictions on lawyers who work
in programs that receive its money, including
bans on class actions, on most representation
of undocumented aliens, on actions to recover
lawyers' fees, on participating in cases on behalf
of a prisoner and on representing tenants
evicted for drug use from public housing. The
restrictions have been carried over in
subsequent fiscal years.
The Clinton administration appealed to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the restriction
posed no constitutional problem because
Congress "has simply chosen to pay for certain
services but not others."
The administration's brief said what was
barred was not a viewpoint but rather "a certain
class of case," explaining that Congress limited
the program "to ensure that the program
focuses on the day-to-day legal problems of the
poor people who are attempting to obtain
benefits to which they may be entitled under
the current program" rather than on trying to
change the program.
The Brennan Center for Justice at New
York University Law School challenged the
restrictions, as well as separate limitations on
the use of private money by legal services
lawyers, on behalf of groups of legal services
lawyers and clients. While the Legal Services
Corporation itself was the defendant in the
lawsuit, filed in 1997 in Federal District Court
in Brooklyn, the federal government intervened
to defend the constitutionality of the
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restrictions. Legal Services of New York, a
recipient of Legal Services Corporation money,
was also a defendant in the lawsuit.
The plaintiffs lost in district court and, for
the most part, in the Second Circuit as well.
The appeals court upheld most of the
restrictions, with the exception of the welfare
restriction. Under the analysis of the appellate
panel's 2-to-1 decision, it might well have been
acceptable for Congress to place welfare cases
of all kinds out of bounds for legal services
lawyers; what offended the majority was the
limitation on the legal tools that lawyers could
use once they were in the midst of representing
clients seeking welfare benefits.
The Supreme Court today granted appeals
from both the Legal Services Corporation
(Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, No. 99-603)
and the government (United States v.
Velazquez, No. 99-960). The two appeals will
be consolidated for argument, which will be
held in October. The justices took no action on
the plaintiffs' separate appeal from the portions
of their suit that they lost in the Second Circuit
(Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., No. 99-
604).
In its appeal, the administration said it was
clear from Supreme Court precedents that the
government could incorporate its preference
for the use of its money into federal law or
regulations. The case the administration cited
was a 1991 decision, Rust v. Sullivan, which
upheld a prohibition on counseling about
abortion in family planning clinics that received
federal money.
In fact, the administration said, the legal
services restrictions were less stringent than
those the Supreme Court upheld in the 1991
case, because employees of clinics that received
federal money were prohibited from
mentioning abortion at all, and could not refer
women to private clinics or doctors even if the
patient made a direct request. President Clinton
repealed those regulations early in his
administration.
Under the legal services restrictions, lawyers
can still refer potential clients to outside
lawyers, including to affiliated poverty law
programs that are not financed with federal
money.
Whether Rust v. Sullivan, the precedent on
which the administration is relying, ultimately
proves reliable depends in part on Justice David
H. Souter's current view of that case. It was a 5-
to-4 decision in which Justice Souter, then just
completing his first term on the court, joined
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's majority
opinion.
But as Justice Souter indicated last week,
when he repudiated an approach he took to a
state ban on nude dancing, in another 1991
case, his view of the First Amendment has
changed over the years. Two years ago, in fact,
Justice Souter was the lone dissenter from a
decision that rejected a challenge to the decency
standards that Congress imposed on the grant-
making procedures of the National
Endowment for the Arts.
These were among the other developments
at the court today.
Abortion Argument
Without comment, the justices turned
down the Clinton administration's request for
time to argue later this month against the
constitutionality of Nebraska's so-called partial-
birth abortion law. The lawyers challenging the
state law on behalf of a Bellevue, Neb., doctor,
Dr. LeRoy Carhart, had agreed to give the
administration 10 minutes of their half-hour
argument.
Lawyers speculated today that the court
might have turned down the request because
there was no equivalent federal law on the
books, making the government's interest
somewhat more remote than usual when it
seeks to participate in a state case. President
Clinton has twice vetoed a proposed federal
law. The administration has filed a brief in this
case, Stenberg v. Carhart, No. 99-830.
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Case Dismissed
Deadlocked in a 4-to-4 tie vote, the court
dismissed a case argued last week that had been
expected to produce a ruling on federal court
jurisdiction over certain kinds of plaintiffs in
class-action lawsuits. The case was Free v.
Abbott Laboratories, No. 99-39 1, a price-fixing
case against manufacturers of baby formula.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who owns a
modest amount of stock in one of the
defendant companies, did not participate.
Copyright C) 2000 The New York Times
Company
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Donald James GRALIKE v. Rebecca McDowell COOK
The Struggle for Tern Linmits Goes On.
David P. Primack*
Four years ago, the citizens of Missouri asked their candidates for Congress to demonstrate
them whether or not they supported term limits. This upcoming term, the Supreme Court will decide,
to paraphrase a Missouri native, if the news of the death of the term limits movement has been greatly
exaggerated.
The early 1990's were marked by a national anti-incumbent attitude that expressed itself most
notably in the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress. One of the key provisions of the Republican's
"Contract with America" was the institution of term limits on Congressional members. States, likewise,
reflected this attitude by amending their state constitutions to impose term limits on their various
officeholders, including members of Congress. In 1995, the Supreme Court, in U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton (1995), struck down these state specific qualifications for Congress in a close 5-4 vote. The
Court decided that congressional term limits could only be imposed by an amendment to the federal
Constitution.
Not daunted by Thornton, this term limit movement was able to pass measures in many states
that placed next to the names of candidates on election ballots a statement as to whether or not this
particular candidate was a supporter of term limits. In 1996, the citizens of Missouri ratified an
amendment to the state constitution that enacted one of these "instruct and inform" or "scarlet letter"
measures, depending on one's view of the matter. Missouri's measure required current congressional
members to work and vote in favor of a federal constitutional amendment for imposing term limits and
if they did not do so, on the next election ballot it would say "disregarded voters' instructions" besides
their name. Furthermore, the Missouri amendment required new candidates to pledge that they would
work for term limits if elected. If an aspiring candidate did not do so, the election ballot would read
"declined to pledge support for term limits" beside their name. In 1998, Donald Gralike challenged the
constitutionality of the Missouri amendment when he ran for the U.S. House of Representatives. The
district court agreed with Gralike and found the amendment an unconstitutional infringement of free
speech. The Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision.
At issue in this case is whether the Missouri amendment violates Article I, Article V, or the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Writing for the Eighth Circuit panel majority, Judge Theodore
McMillian held that the labeling violated Gralike's First Amendment right to free speech because, "[t]he
Missouri Amendment compels candidates to speak about term limits." Judge McMillian noted that the
Missouri Amendment "does not allow candidates to remain silent on the issue, which is precisely the
type of state-compelled speech which violates the First Amendment right not to speak." The State of
Missouri, represented by the Secretary of State Rebecca Cook, argued that since there were no criminal
or monetary sanctions, the measure only compels the exposure of a candidate's view on term limits, but
the majority rejected this because the political damage is sanction enough to compel speech unjustly.
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2002.
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The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the Missouri Amendment added an impermissible
qualification for candidacy to the U.S. Congress in violation of Article I of the Constitution. Basing
their conclusion on the two-prong test in Thornton for identifying an impermissible indirect attempt to
alter qualifications for Congress, the Eighth Circuit asserted that the Missouri Amendment failed the
Thornton two part analysis because it (1) specifically targets a distinct class of candidates and (2) has the
sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly. The distinct class of people is "those who
oppose term limits, refuse to take the term limit pledge, or fail to do one or more of the actions
prescribed by the Amendment while serving in Congress." Furthermore, the amendment requires the
candidate "to initiate, pursue, and support the Article V amendment process," and as such is "an
indirect attempt to add a qualification to those listed in the Qualifications Clause."
Finally, the Eighth Circuit found that the Missouri amendment violated the federal amendment
process as stated in Article V of the Constitution. The court noted that "[vioter initiatives which seek
to coerce legislators into proposing or ratifying a particular constitutional amendment violate Article
V." According to the court, legislative bodies, not voter referendums, are the proper forum for
amending the Constitution. Missouri cited Kimble v. Swackhamer (1978) for support. In that case, Justice
William Rehnquist wrote that a non-binding referendum about the Equal Rights Amendment did not
interfere with the Article V amendment process because legislators were free to disregard it. The
Eighth Circuit distinguished this case from Kimble because legislators are not free under the Missouri
amendment to disregard the politically damaging penalty of having a label being placed beside their
name at the next election.
Those who have followed Cook v. Gralike have noted how unusual it is that the Supreme Court
decided to grant certiorari because there has been no disagreement in the lower courts and other similar
measures in other states have been struck down without any further controversy. When the Court
takes up the case next term, the ailing term movement will find out whether or not its time has ended.
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99-929 Cook v. Gralike
Ruling below (8h Cir., 191 F.3d 911, 68 U.S.L.W. 1153):
Voter-initiated amendment to Missouri Constitution that directs state's congressional delegation and
candidates for such offices to support federal constitutional amendment creating congressional term
limits and prescribes that any noncompliance or nonsupport of such directive be noted on ballot
violates First Amendment and Article V of U.S. Constitution, as well as qualification and speech and
debate clauses of Article I.
Questions presented: (1) Do people violate Article V of Constitution when they participate in
evolution of their government by communicating their opinion to federal legislators or by
communicating on ballot to voters about behavior of federal candidates? (2) Do people violate
qualifications clauses and First Amendment when they comment on ballot regarding elected
representative's actions and voting record or when they comment on ballot about non-incumbent
congressional candidate's silence concerning prospective constitutional amendment? (3) Does speech
and debate clause of Constitution prohibit people from commenting on ballot about federal legislator's
actions and voting record in regard to prospective constitutional amendment?
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Donald James GRALIKE, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Rebecca McDowell COOK, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
Decided August 31, 1999
McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Rebecca McDowell Cook, in her
official capacity as Secretary of State of the
State of Missouri, appeals from a final order
entered in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri granting
summary judgment in favor of appellee Donald
James Gralike, and invalidating as
unconstitutional the 1996 Missouri ballot
initiative concerning term limits for members
of the United States Congress, codified at
Article VIII, Sections 15-22 of the Missouri
Constitution. *** For reversal, Cook argues that
the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for appellee because the amendment
does not violate the First Amendment or
Articles I or V of the United States
Constitution. For the reasons discussed below,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 1996 the voters of Missouri
passed an amendment to Article VIII of the
Missouri Constitution (hereinafter "Missouri
Amendment" or "Amendment") to limit the
number of terms any individual may serve in
the United States Congress. The Amendment
seeks to limit congressional service to three
terms in the House of Representatives and two
terms in the Senate. See MO. CONST. Art.
VIII, §16. To achieve this goal, the Missouri
Amendment orders members of Missouri's
congressional delegation to use their authority
to amend the United States Constitution to
impose the term limits in §16 on Congressional
service. See id. § 17.
If a Missouri Representative or Senator fails
to comply with this order, the Missouri
Amendment dictates that the label
"DISREGARDED VOTERS'
INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" be
printed next to his or her name on all ballots
during the next election. Id. The Missouri
Amendment defines a failure to comply with
the instructions as: (1) failure to vote in favor of
a term limit amendment conforming with §16;
(2) failure to second it if a second is lacking; (3)
failure to propose or otherwise bring to a vote a
term limit amendment conforming with §16; (4)
failure to vote favorably on measures to bring
such an amendment before committee; (5)
failure to vote against all measures to delay,
table, or otherwise prevent a vote by the full
body; (6) failure to vote against amendments
allowing longer terms of Congressional service
than §16 allows; (7) sponsoring or
cosponsoring an amendment with longer terms
than those in §16; and (8) failure to ensure that
all votes on term limits are recorded and
available to the public. See id.
The Missouri Amendment requires non-
incumbent candidates to take a pledge to use
their authority to amend the United States
Constitution to impose the term limits in §16 if
elected. It orders that those who do not take
the pledge have the label "DECLINED TO
PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS"
printed next to their names on the ballot. Id.
§18. To avoid being labeled on the ballot, non-
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incumbent candidates must take the following
pledge:
I support term limits and pledge to use all
my legislative powers to enact the proposed
Constitutional Amendment set forth in the
Term Limits Act of 1996. If elected, I pledge to
vote in such a way that the designation
"DISREGARDED VOTERS'
INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" will not
appear adjacent to my name. §18(3).
For both incumbent and non-incumbent
candidates, the Missouri Amendment requires
the Secretary of State to decide whether a label
will be printed on the ballot and to consider
public comment in making that determination.
See id. §19 (1-4). It allows individual voters to
appeal the Secretary of State's decision not to
print the label by a candidate's name directly to
the Missouri Supreme Court, in which case the
Secretary of State must produce clear and
convincing evidence that the candidate
conformed with the initiative or took the
pledge. It also permits a candidate, whom the
Secretary of State decides shall have the label
appear next to his or her name on the ballot, to
appeal this decision to the Missouri Supreme
Court, in which case the candidate must
produce clear and convincing evidence why the
label should not be printed on the ballot. See id.
§19(5, 6). In addition, the Missouri Amendment
automatically repeals itself if and when the
United States Constitution is amended to
conform with the §16 term limits. See id. §20.
It also grants the Missouri Supreme Court
original jurisdiction to hear challenges to the
Amendment. See id. §21. Finally, it contains a
severability clause. See id. §22.
Soon after its passage, appellee initiated this
action in federal district court challenging the
Missouri Amendment on several federal
constitutional grounds. - Appellee is not
currently a member of the Missouri
congressional delegation, but he was a
candidate for the third district Congressional
seat in 1998 and has issued a declaration of his
intent to run for the same seat in 2000. The
district court issued three memorandum orders
addressing different motions by the parties. In
the first order, the district court denied in part
and granted in part appellant's motion to
dismiss, finding that appellee did have standing
to sue, did meet the requirements for injunctive
relief, that appellant was not protected by
Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the court
need not abstain from judgment since there
were no unanswered questions of state law, and
that the court need not certify questions of
federal law to the Missouri Supreme Court
since that court has held that it lacks
jurisdiction over such questions. *** In its
second order, the district court granted in part
and denied in part appellant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim; it denied appellant's
motion to dismiss appellee's claims that the
Missouri Amendment violates Article I, Article
V, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution, but granted
her motion to dismiss appellee's claim that §21
of the Missouri Amendment violates the
Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. *** In its final order in this case,
the district court granted appellee's motion for
summary judgment on his Article I, Article V,
and First Amendment Claims; the district court
did not reach plaintiff-appellee's Due Process
vagueness claim because it determined that the
other three claims were sufficient to dispose of
the case.*** The district court, in Gralike III,
relied upon its earlier order in Gralike II for the
analysis supporting its decision to grant
summary judgment for plaintiff-appellee.
Judgment was entered for appellee, and
appellant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. FIRST AMENDMENT
Appellant argues that the district court
erred in holding that the Missouri Amendment
violates the First Amendment guarantee of free
speech. First, she argues that, because the
Missouri Amendment imposes no sanction on
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candidates for United States Congress for
failure to speak, the district court erred in
concluding that the Missouri Amendment
compels or coerces candidates to speak.
Second, she argues that the district court should
not have analyzed the Missouri Amendment
under strict scrutiny review, but rather should
have balanced candidates' right to keep their
views on term limits secret with the electorate's
right to know the views of candidates.
Furthermore, she points out, the Amendment
was the result of a popular election, and the
courts should be especially careful when
considering legislation passed by direct
democracy. We agree with the district court's
well-reasoned analysis, and reject appellant's
arguments.
1. Compelled speech
It is well established that the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution
bars not only state action which restricts free
expression but also state action which compels
individuals to speak or express a certain point
of view. *** Moreover, "the burden upon
freedom of expression is particularly great
where, as here, the compelled speech is in the
public context."*** We hold that the Missouri
Amendment is an impermissible attempt by the
State of Missouri to compel candidates to
express a point of view on term limits. ***
In Wooley, the Supreme Court invalidated
the conviction of a New Hampshire couple
who covered the state motto "Live Free or
Die" on their license plate, concluding that "the
right of freedom of thought protected by the
First Amendment against state action includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all." *** Since Wooley,
the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
prohibition on compelled speech and refined it
to apply to cases in which the government
orders certain types of speech or speech about
certain topics. For example, in Rily v. Nat' Fed.
of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
786, 101 L Ed. 2d 669, 108 S. Ct. 2667 (1988),
the Court invalidated on First Amendment
grounds a North Carolina law which, among
other things, required professional fund raisers,
before soliciting donations, to disclose what
portion of donations they turned over to the
charities for which they solicited in the
preceding twelve months. The Court concluded
that the state law violated the First Amendment
prohibition on state-compelled speech because
"the First Amendment mandates that we
presume that speakers, not the government,
know best both what they want to say and how
to say it.... To this end, the government... may
not substitute its judgment as to how best to
speak for that of speakers and listeners...." Id. at
790-91; see also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm'n of Calfornia, 475 U.S. 1,
14-16, 89 L Ed. 2d 1, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986)
("the State is not free either to restrict
appellant's speech to certain topics or views or
to force appellant to respond to views that
others may hold.... The choice to speak includes
within it the choice of what not to say....").
The Missouri Amendment compels
candidates to speak about term limits. First, it
attempts to force candidates to speak in favor
of term limits by threatening them with the
ballot label if they fail to do so. Second, if a
candidate refuses to speak in favor of term
limits, the label on the ballot forces him or her
to speak in opposition to the Amendment by
noting that he or she failed to follow the voters'
wishes. Either way, the Missouri Amendment
does not allow candidates to remain silent on
the issue, which is precisely the type of state-
compelled speech which violates the First
Amendment right not to speak. First, the
Missouri Amendment selects the topic for
public debate: term limits. Second, it chooses
an approved position: favoring term limits.
Third, it provides the actual words which non-
incumbent candidates shall speak: the pledge.
Finally, in the event its attempts to compel
speech in favor of term limits fail, the Missouri
Amendment provides a mechanism to compel
candidates to speak in opposition: the ballot
labels.
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Appellant attempts to distinguish the
Missouri Amendment from other compelled
speech cases by arguing that the Missouri
Amendment does not compel speech because it
imposes no criminal or monetary sanction for
refusing to speak. Rather, the only possible
sanction the Missouri Amendment could
impose, appellant argues, is the exposure of
candidates' views and/or record on term limits.
We disagree. As a threshold matter, we note
that the concept of compelled speech has never
been limited to those cases in which the state
seeks to impose or compel speech through
threat of financial or criminal sanction. See, e.g.,
Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258 ("Even if a
newspaper would face no additional costs to
comply ... the Florida statute [compelling
speech] fails to clear the barriers of the First
Amendment ...."). Nevertheless, we believe that
the Missouri Amendment in fact threatens a
penalty that is serious enough to compel
candidates to speak--the potential political
damage of the ballot labels. ***
Contrary to appellant's contentions that the
labels only provide information about the
candidates' views, the labels do far more than
advise voters of a candidates' opposition to
term limits. The labels are phrased in such a
way they are likely to give (and we believe
calculated to give) a negative impression not
only of a labeled candidate's views on term
limits, but also of his or her commitment and
accountability to his or her constituents. ***
The nonincumbent label "DECLINED TO
PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS," in
light of the preamble and §16 of the
Amendment which state that the people of
Missouri desire term limits, indicates that a
candidate so labeled refused to promise to do
the people's bidding. The incumbent label
"DISREGARDED VOTERS'
INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS"
indicates that, during the preceding term, the
candidate failed to act in accordance with his or
her constituents' wishes. Each label implies that
a labeled candidate cannot be trusted to carry
out the people's bidding, which in turn casts
doubt on his or her suitability to serve i
Congress.
The pejorative nature of the labels is
heightened by the fact that there are no labels
for candidates who take the pledge or comply
with the mandates of §17 while in office. The
only "information" the Missouri Amendment
adds to the ballot is derogatory labels for
candidates who do not do what it requires.
Furthermore, the labels are particularly harmful
because they appear on the ballot, an official
document produced by the state. Thus, the
labels appear to be an official denunciation of
certain candidates who are singled out by the
state for their failure to speak in favor of term
limits or take all action that §17 requires. ***
The ballot labels are a serious sanction, which
we believe is sufficient to coerce candidates to
speak out in favor of term limits rather than
risk the political consequences associated with
being labeled on the ballot. Moreover, the fact
that the label appears on the ballot compels
candidates to speak because the labels
themselves constitute speech. Once the label is
on the ballot, it ascribes a point of view to the
labeled candidate.
Arguing that the First Amendment does
not insulate candidates from the electorate,
appellant points out that individuals become
subject to the Missouri Amendment only if they
chose to run for office. However, "[a] political
candidate does not lose the protection of the
First Amendment when he [or she] declares
himself [or herself] for public office." *** An
individual's choice to serve the public by
seeking congressional office does not grant the
state licence to restrict or compel his or her
speech. On the contrary, speech restrictions are
particularly destructive in the political arena,
where the importance of free exchange of ideas
and information--a vital aspect of our
democratic system--is at its zenith.
Furthermore, "the identity of the speaker is not
decisive in determining whether speech is
protected." Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 8. Thus we
reject appellee's suggestion that candidates for
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public office are afforded diminished First
Amendment protections.
2. Application of Strict Scrutiny
Appellant also argues that the district court
erred in applying strict scrutiny analysis to
determine the constitutionality of the Missouri
Amendment. She contends that instead the
district court should have applied a "balancing
test" and upheld the Amendment since the
electorate's right to know candidates' views on
term limits outweighs that of candidates to
remain silent on the issue. Appellee's Brief at 19
(hereinafter "App. Br."). We disagree.
The District Court correctly determined
that the Missouri Amendment is subject to
strict scrutiny review. First, as discussed above,
the Amendment burdens candidates' right to
free expression by compelling them to state or
act in such a way as to portray a position on the
§16 term limits proposal. This is an
impermissible restriction on core political
speech, which subjects the Amendment to strict
scrutiny review. *** However, even assuming
for purposes of analysis that the Missouri
Amendment did not compel political speech,
strict scrutiny review is warranted because the
Amendment is a content-based, viewpoint-
specific restriction on candidates' right to free
speech. ***
The Missouri Amendment is content-based
because it addresses the issue of term limits,
completely ignoring all other issues. In addition,
it is content-based because it compels
candidates to speak about the issue of term
limits, which they might not do absent state
action. *** Furthermore, the Missouri
Amendment is viewpoint-specific because the
labeling provisions single out individual
candidates for punishment based only on their
opposition-actual or ascribed-to term limits.
The Missouri Amendment only labels those
who, according to the Secretary of State,
oppose the Amendment's term limits proposal,
and does nothing to those who pledge to
support it. As such, the Missouri Amendment is
a state-imposed, viewpoint specific restriction
on candidates' speech which triggers strict
scrutiny review. ***
We hold that the district court correctly
determined that the Missouri Amendment
should be subject to strict scrutiny review. n8
To survive strict scrutiny review, appellant must
prove that the Missouri Amendment is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.***
Appellant maintains that the Missouri
Amendment ensures the electorate's right to
know candidates' views. We construe this to
mean that voter education is the compelling
state interest the Missouri Amendment is meant
to achieve. While we agree that an informed
electorate is important in our democratic
system of government, we hold that the
Missouri Amendment fails strict scrutiny review
because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve
the goal of voter education. First, the Missouri
Amendment only provides information about
candidates views on term limits, neglecting
every other issue. Although the voters of
Missouri obviously feel strongly about term
limits, we believe that a state measure that
informs voters only of candidates' views on
term limits does not ensure an informed
electorate. Second, the Missouri Amendment is
not narrowly tailored to achieve even the more
limited goal of informing voters of candidates'
views on term limits, because it can falsely
identify candidates. For example, the
Amendment could require the placement of a
ballot label next to the name of a term limits
supporter who failed to comply with an aspect
of 517(2). See also supra note 7. Finally, there
are less restrictive means to promote voter
education, which indicates that the Missouri
Amendment is not narrowly tailored.*** For
example, Missouri could institute voluntary
programs, such as debates or voter information
guides, to provide information about
candidates' views on term limits and other
important issues. Such programs advance the
State's interest in informing voters without
compelling candidates to speak or restricting
their right not to speak.
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Since appellant failed to prove that the
labeling provisions of the Missouri Amendment
are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest, she has failed to justify its
infringement on candidates' right to free
speech. The label provisions of the Missouri
Amendment are barred by the First
Amendment as applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE 9
A related issue, which applies more
appropriately to incumbent candidates, is
whether the Missouri Amendment violates
Article 1, section 6, clause 1 of the United
States Constitution--the Speech and Debate
Clause, which states, in relevant part: "... for any
Speech or Debate in either House, they
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place." The Missouri
Amendment contravenes this guarantee
because it establishes a regime in which a state
officer--the secretary of state-is permitted to
judge and punish members of Congress for
their legislative actions or positions.***
The Missouri Amendment specifically vests
in the secretary of state of Missouri the
responsibility to determine when the ballot
label shall appear next to the name of an
incumbent candidate. See MO. CONST. art.
VIII, §19. In so doing, she is to accept and
consider public comments. See id. at §19(3). As
we discussed above, the ballot label
' Although the district court did not address
this issue, we believe it is necessary to
demonstrate why the Missouri Amendment is
invalid as applied to incumbent candidates.
Since the situation of incumbent candidates is
somewhat different than that of non-incumbent
candidates, the First Amendment issues
discussed in Section II A do not apply as
squarely to incumbent candidates. As such we
exercise our discretion to affirm the judgment
on this ground, although it was not considered
by the district court.
"DISREGARDED VOTERS'
INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" is a
pejorative label with politically damaging
ramifications, which amounts to punishment.
Thus, the Missouri Amendment establishes a
system by which Senators and Representatives
are questioned about and can be punished for
speech, debate, and actions in Congress. This
system contradicts the protections of the
Speech and Debate clause, which is intended to
allow Senators and Representatives to speak
and vote their conscience without fear of
retribution. ***
The portions of the Missouri Amendment
dealing with labeling incumbent candidates
based on their legislative speech and actions
violate of the Speech and Debate clause. *
C. QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSE
Appellant next contends that the district
court erred in concluding that the Missouri
Amendment constitutes an impermissible
qualification for candidacy for the United States
Congress in violation of the Qualifications
Clause, Article 1 of the United States
Constitution. Appellant argues that the
Missouri Amendment does no more than
provide information about candidates and does
not constitute a qualification within the
meaning of Article I. We disagree.
We believe that Qualifications Clause issues
raised in this case were addressed by the
Supreme Court in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 131 L Ed. 2d 881, 115 S. Ct.
1842 (1995). In that case the Court held that an
amendment to the Arkansas Constitution,
which banned the names of incumbents who
had served more than two terms in the United
States Senate or three terms in the United
States House of Representatives from
appearing on the ballot, established an
impermissible additional qualification for
candidacy for Congress. *** After conducting a
thorough historical review, the Court
determined that neither the Framers, the
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constructs of our democratic society, the text of
the Constitution itself, nor past Congressional
action supported the contention that states may
impose additional or different qualifications
than those set out in the Qualifications Clause.
*** Rather, the Court stated, any state authority
to set qualifications for Congress was abrogated
by the ratification of the Constitution, and the
sole source of qualifications for Congressional
.office is contained in Article I. *** Thus, any
attempt by a state to alter or add to these
qualifications is clearly proscribed by the
Constitution.
Furthermore, the Court found that indirect
attempts to modify Congressional qualifications
were equally infirm. Although the Arkansas
Amendment did not prohibit incumbents from
service in Congress, the Court rejected the
petitioner's contention that the Arkansas
Amendment did not impose an impermissible
qualification because incumbents could still be
elected as write-in candidates. *** The Court
determined that States cannot achieve by
indirect means what is constitutionally
prohibited by direct means. *** To identify
impermissible indirect attempts to alter
qualifications for Congress, the Court devised a
two-part test: "a state amendment is
unconstitutional when it has the likely effect of
handicapping a class of candidates and has the
sole purpose of creating additional
qualifications indirectly." ***
The Missouri Amendment fails US Term
Limit's test. First, the Amendment specifically
targets a distinct class of candidates-those who
oppose term limits, refuse to take the term
limits pledge, or fail to do one or more of the
actions prescribed by the Amendment while
serving in Congress. This class of candidates is
singled out on the ballot with the damaging
labels. The label provisions will have the likely
effect of coercing candidates to support the
term limits mandate or removing candidates
who fail to do so by persuading voters not to
elect them. As we discussed above, the ballot
labels cast doubt on labeled candidates' ability
to represent constituents, since the labels state
that labeled candidates ignore their constituents'
wishes. As such, the Missouri Amendment is
likely to handicap labeled candidates' ability to
be elected.
Second, as discussed above, the Missouri
Amendment has the sole, expressed purpose of
adding the qualification to congressional service
that candidates must have served fewer than
three terms in the House or two terms in the
Senate. Sections 15 and 16 of the Missouri
Amendment state that the people of Missouri
seek to limit the number of terms of service in
Congress to three in the House and two in the
Senate. To attain this goal, the Missouri
Amendment requires members of the Missouri
congressional delegation to pursue the Article
V amendment process, and it enforces this
mandate with the threat of the ballot labels. See
MO. CONST. art. VIII, §17. Thus, adding the
term limit qualification is the sole purpose of
the Missouri Amendment. The fact that the
Missouri Amendment seeks to do so by
compelling members of Congress from
Missouri to initiate, pursue, and support the
Article V amendment process does not change
the analysis under US Term Limits, as it is still
an indirect attempt to add a qualification to
those listed in the Qualifications Clause. Since
the Missouri Amendment seeks to impose an
additional qualification for candidacy for
Congress and does so in a manner which is
highly likely to handicap term limit opponents
and other labeled candidates, it fails the US
Term Limits test.***
D. ARTICLE V
Lastly, appellant argues that the district
court erred in holding that the Missouri
Amendment violates Article V of the United
States Constitution, which sets out the process
through which the Constitution may be
amended. She contends that the Missouri
Amendment does not alter the Article V
process. We disagree.
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Article V of the United States Constitution
sets forth the two processes through which the
United States Constitution may be amended.
Article V states in relevant part:
the Congress, whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress....
U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V specifically
delegates the amendment process to legislative
bodies, not the voters.
Supreme Court precedent supports the
conclusion that the people have a limited, third-
party role in the amendment process. In
invalidating an Ohio constitutional amendment
which required ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment by popular referendum, the Court
held that the ratification of a constitutional
amendment was a federal function derived
from Article V, which delineates the sole
methods for ratification. In Leser v. Garnett, 258
U.S. 130, 137, 66 L Ed. 505, 42 S. Ct. 217
(1922), the Court held that the ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment was not subject to
state-imposed restrictions on the amendment
process. The Court again determined that state
legislatures ratifying constitutional amendments
assume a federal function, which "transcends
any limitations sought to be imposed by the
people of a State." Id. Article V envisions
legislatures acting as freely deliberative bodies
in the amendment process and resists any
attempt by the people of a state to restrict the
legislatures' actions.
More recently, two state courts were
confronted with voter-initiated attempts to
direct the Article V amendment process. The
Supreme Courts of California and Montana
invalidated, on Article V grounds, voter
initiatives that compelled the California and
Montana State legislatures to apply to Congress
to call a constitutional convention to consider a
balanced budget amendment. *** In each case,
the initiative required State legislators to
continue in session without pay if they did not
pass the necessary petitions within a specified
period. Both courts determined that such voter-
imposed restrictions on legislators' ability to
deliberate the issues independently violated
Article V. ***
Appellant maintains that Article V does not
prohibit the electorate from directing elected
officials to amend the Constitution. He relies
principally on Kimble v. Swackhamer. 439 U.S.
1385, 58 L Ed. 2d 225, 99 S. Ct. 51 (1978), to
support this contention. In that case then
Justice Rehnquist, sitting as Circuit Justice,
denied an injunction against a non-binding
referendum in Nevada about the Equal Rights
Amendment. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
the referendum did not alter the Article V
process because it only served to advise
legislators of the people's wishes and legislators
were free to disregard it. ***
However, the Missouri Amendment is far
more than an advisory, non-binding show of
voters' opinion on term limits. *** By its own
terms, the Missouri Amendment requires
Senators and Representatives from Missouri to
initiate and support the Article V process: "We,
the Voters of Missouri, hereby instruct each
member of our congressional delegation to use
all of his or her delegated powers to pass the
Congressional Term Limits Amendment." MO.
CONST. art. VIII, § 17(1). *** Furthermore,
the Missouri Amendment seeks to coerce
members of Congress to comply with this
mandate by threatening them with the
politically-damaging ballot labels -if they fail to
do so. Thus, unlike the Nevada legislators in
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Kimble, members of Missouri's congressional
delegation are not free to disregard the
instruction embodied in the Amendment. ***
We cannot accept appellant's argument that
the Missouri amendment does not alter the
Article V process. Voter initiatives which seek
to coerce legislators into proposing or ratifying
a particular constitutional amendment violate
Article V. As discussed above, the Missouri
Amendment's ballot labels constitute such an
attempt by the voters to directly influence the
Article V process by directing Senators and
Representatives from Missouri to support and
pursue the proposal and ratification of a term
limits amendment to the United States
Constitution.
III. CONCLUSION
The record, viewed in the light most
favorable to appellant, reveals no genuine issue
of material fact and that appellee is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because the
Missouri Amendment violates the First
Amendment, the Speech and Debate Clause,
the Qualifications Clause, and Article V of the
United States Constitution.12
12 Judge Hansen dissents from our decision to
strike the Missouri Amendment in its entirety
and argues that, instead, we should sever §§17-
19 and leave the remainder of the Amendment
intact, if we followed Judge Hansen's
recommendation, Article VIII of the Missouri
Constitution would state that the people of
Missouri seek to amend the United States
Constitution by adding a term limit
qualification for Congressional service.
Although there would no longer be a State-
imposed punishment for candidates who fail to
support the proposed term limit, the Missouri
Constitution would still contain: (a) a direct
attempt by the people to amend the US
Constitution and (b) an attempt by the State
and people of Missouri to add a qualification to
Article I. Because we believe that both these
attempts are unconstitutional, we cannot follow
Judge Hansen's suggestion, notwithstanding
this court's decision in Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d
1119 (8th Cir. 1999).
First, as we noted in Part IID, the people are
not to play a direct role in the Article V
amendment process. While we agree with Judge
Hansen that advisory communication between
the people and their elected officials is
permitted, we believe that the Missouri
Amendment constitutes more than such merely
advisory communications, and, as such, is
barred by Article V. Assuming for the purposes
of analysis that a Circuit Justice opinion for the
Ninth Circuit is binding precedent in the
Eighth Circuit, we believe that Kimble is
distinguishable. The referendum in Kimble was
initiated by the Nevada legislature and
specifically stated that "the result of the voting
on this question does not place any legal
requirement on the legislature or any of its
members." 439 U.S. at 1386 (quoting 1977 Nev.
Stats., ch. 174, § § 3, 5). If the Missouri
Amendment contained similar language, we
would agree with Judge Hansen that it is not
coercive. However, in the absence of such
language, we believe that the memorialization in
the Missouri Constitution of the people's intent
to pass a specific amendment to the United
States Constitution departs from the expressly
advisory, non binding referendum then-Justice
Rehnquist found to be permissible in Kimble
and comes closer to the direct involvement the
Supreme Court disallowed in Lesser and
Hawke. See Part IID, above.
Second, as we noted in Part IIC, states cannot
constitutionally add to or alter the qualifications
for federal office. See U.S. Const. art. I. Thus,
%§15 and 16 are arguably barred by Article I
because they are an attempt by a State to add to
or change the qualifications for service in the
United States Congress--as opposed to an
Article V petition for a Constitutional
convention from a State legislature to consider
amending the United States Constitution.
Finally, we refuse to sever the Missouri
Amendment on jurisprudential grounds,
because if we choose to sever %§17-19, we must
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DISSENT:
HANSEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
I readily concur with Part I of the opinion
of the court and with those portions of Part II
which declare the labeling provisions (§§17, 18,
and 19) of the Missouri Amendment to be in
violation of the Constitution. I write separately,
however, specifically to assert my view that
%§15 and 16 of the Missouri Amendment are
severable pursuant to §22 of the Amendment
and are not independently unconstitutional
under the court's reasoning in Part II. Because I
believe %§15 and 16 remain legitimate political
expressions of the citizens of Missouri, I must
respectfully dissent from that portion of the
court's opinion and judgment which sweeps
away the entirety of the Missouri Amendment.
In Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1126 (8th
Cir. 1999), this court recently held, while
striking down several sections of a similar
Nebraska term limits amendment, that the
section declaring the official position of the
citizens of Nebraska to be that their elected
officials should enact a term limits amendment
was severable and constitutional. The principle
established in Miller v. Moore is equally
applicable to the Missouri Amendment at issue
in this case. Standing alone, %§15 and 16 are a
legitimate, nonbinding form of political
expression by the citizens of Missouri
explaining their support for a specific term
limits amendment to the United States
Constitution.
also sever portions of 516 which are
unconstitutional or superfluous in the absence
of §§17-19. Such micro-management of the
Missouri Constitution would entangle this court
too much in State law issues. As such, we opt
to abstain from such action.
The opinion of the court suggests that §515
and 16 standing alone violate Article V and
Article I of the federal Constitution because
they are, respectively, "a direct attempt by the
people to amend the US Constitution" and "an
attempt by the State and people of Missouri to
add a qualification to Article I."*** With
respect to the latter, I believe the people of
Missouri indeed have the absolute right under
Article V to propose in a public
pronouncement an addition to or an alteration
of the qualifications for congressional service
found in Article I. Once %§17 through 19 are
struck down, §§15 and 16 do not in any way
add to or alter the current qualifications for
Missouri's congressional delegation, nor do they
affect in any way federal election procedures.
Furthermore, §15 could not be more explicit
when it states that the purpose of the voter-
approved initiative is to "lead to the adoption
of the following U.S. Constitutional
Amendment." Therefore, I see nothing
unconstitutional about these efforts (§§15 and
16) by the people of Missouri to secure an
amendment to Article I through the Article V
process, and nothing in the decision in U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 131
L Ed 2d 881, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995), suggests
otherwise.
With respect to Article V, the "people"
(that is, the citizenry) have more than "a
limited, third party role in the amendment
process." *** In fact, "We the People" have at
least as important a role in the process of
amending the Constitution as they did in
creating it. It was, after all, the "people" who
forced the first ten amendments to be adopted.
As the court correctly points out, the people
have no formal role in the amendmentprocedures
set out in Article V. However, the people play a
crucial, substantive role in the amendment
process by bringing political pressure to bear--
through political speech, mobilization, and
other activities--on those who under the
Constitution do control the formal procedures.
Standing alone, %§15 and 16 are nothing more
than the people of the state of Missouri
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SUPREME COURT TO WADE BACK INTO TERM-LIMITS DEBATE WITH
MISSOURI CASE
The Freedom Forum Online
April 18, 2000
Tony Mauro
The Supreme Court, which has already
done considerable damage to the term-
limits movement, is poised to do it again
in a Missouri case that it will take up this
fall.
The justices yesterday agreed to
consider the case of Cook v. Gralike, which
tests the constitutionality of what some
call "scarlet letter" laws aimed at forcing
candidates for office to support term
limits.
The court's action also reflects its
continuing interest in cases that raise First
Amendment issues in the context of
election and ballot procedures.
In 1995, the Supreme Court in U.S.
Term Limits v. Thornton said term limits
could be imposed on members of
Congress only by constitutional
amendment, a decision that weakened the
then-burgeoning term-limits movement.
In the wake of that decision, Missouri
voters in 1996 passed a state
constitutional amendment ordering the
state's members of Congress to work and
vote in favor of a term-limits
constitutional amendment. It also required
new candidates for congressional seats to
pledge to work for a constitutional
amendment if elected.
Members of Congress and candidates
who did not cooperate would have the
label "Disregarded Voters' Instructions on
Term Limits" or "Declined to Pledge To
Support Term Limits" placed next to their
names on the next election ballot. No
label would be placed next to the name of
candidates who favor term limits.
Similar measures were passed that year
in Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho,
Maine, Nebraska, Nevada and South
Dakota. Two years later, California also
approved an "instruct and inform"
initiative. Every such initiative that has
been challenged in court has been struck
down on one or more constitutional
grounds. One is the "speech and debate
clause," which forbids the punishment of
members of Congress for the positions
they take on the floor of Congress.
Other judges have found the measures
to be an unconstitutional method of
amending the Constitution, while others
say they unconstitutionally add new
qualifications for becoming a member of
Congress.
The First Amendment weakness of the
provisions has been the "compelled
speech" issue, namely that they place
government in the position of forcing
candidates and public officials to speak
on a certain subject and in a certain way.
Not only must they take a position on
term limits, they must also favor term
limits to avoid being branded on the
officials state ballot as opponents.
That was the basis of the claim made
by Missouri congressional candidate Don
Gralike when he challenged the
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constitutional amendment by suing
Secretary of State Rebecca Cook. Two
lower courts sided with Gralike.
In a decision last August, the 8th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals found the
Missouri amendment clearly violated the
First Amendment. "The Missouri
amendment does not allow candidates to
remain silent on the issue, which is
precisely the type of state-compelled
speech which violates the First
Amendment right not to speak."
The state of Missouri disputed that
finding, asserting that the state
amendment does not force candidates to
take a position or punish them if they
don't; it merely informs voters what the
candidates' views are.
"It's clear to us that Missourians
support term limits and any information
on the ballot to help voters to make
informed decisions is useful," state
Attorney General Jay Nixon said
yesterday.
"The labels do far more than advise
voters of a candidates' opposition to term
limits," the 8th Circuit found. "The ballot
labels are a serious sanction, which we
believe is sufficient to coerce candidates
to speak out in favor of term limits rather
than risk the political consequences
associated with being labeled on the
ballot."
The court also found that "speech
restrictions are particularly destructive in
the political arena, where the importance
of free exchange of ideas and information
- a vital aspect of our democratic system
- is at its zenith."
Those points are likely to carry weight
with the Supreme Court, which regards
protection of core political speech as one
of its highest callings. Justice Antonin
Scalia and others are also usually adamant
about not allowing government to favor
one viewpoint over another.
Still, the court's action in taking the
Missouri case came as something of a
surprise. Usually the court takes up a case
when lower courts have disagreed on a
point of law raised by that case. But in this
instance all of the lower courts that have
ruled have struck down measures like
Missouri's.
The court may have agreed to decide
the issue nonetheless to put its own stamp
on how these initiatives should be
evaluated, and to keep states from
inventing other ways to force candidates
to take positions on term limits or other
issues. The case will be argued in the fall,
with a decision unlikely before next year.
Copyright C 2000 The Freedom Forum
Inc.
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SUPREME COURT TO HEAR MISSOURI BALLOT ISSUE CASE
Wording Sought on Tern Lirit Stances
The Kansas City Star
Tuesday, April 18,2000
Kevin Murphy
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide
whether Missouri election ballots can list the
views congressional candidates have on term
limits.
The court announced Monday it would
review a lower court ruling that struck down a
1996 Missouri constitutional amendment to
designate term limit positions so voters could
see how candidates stood on the issue. Courts
have struck down similar measures in nine
states.
"What a shocker," said Arthur A. Benson
II, a Kansas City lawyer who represents a
former candidate for Congress who challenged
the amendment. "It seems unusual the Supreme
Court would take a case where there were no
conflicts among" other courts.
Lawyers for the Missouri attorney general
argued in briefs to the high court that the case
should be heard, although the arguments
wouldn't come in time to affect the 2000
election. At least four of the nine justices must
agree to hear a case, but votes are not disclosed.
"It's appropriate for the Supreme Court to
revisit this issue," Attorney General Jay Nixon
said Monday. "It is important to look at the
broader issues here. I don't think the court took
this case to decide wording in this one case."
Nixon said the question revolves around
how much information states are allowed to
give voters about candidates and issues. For
instance, candidates are listed as Democrat and
Republican and there often are long
explanations of ballot issues.
"I think it's an appropriate function of a
state to determine the composition of its
ballot," Nixon said. "Giving voters more
information has not been dangerous to
democracy in the past and I don't expect it to
be in the future."
Voters passed the state amendment by a 58
percent margin in the November 1996 general
election. It sought to have members of the
congressional delegation enact term limits of 12
years in the Senate and six years in the House.
The amendment also would require
incumbents to show they had supported term
limits, otherwise the ballot would say they
"disregarded voters' instructions. " Non-
incumbents who do not back term limits would
have it noted on the ballot that they "declined
to pledge support for term limits."
A challenge to the amendment was posed
by Donald Gralike, a former state legislator
from St. Louis who ran for U.S. House in 1998
as a Democrat.
On Aug. 31, 1999, the 8th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in St. Louis ruled that putting
term limit views on a ballot was
unconstitutional because it required candidates
to back the limits or have a "derogatory" label
attached to their names.
"It compels speech, which is a violation of
free speech by forcing elected representatives
and candidates to make declarations and say
things," Benson said Monday. "Government
should have no role in enforcing speech."
Benson said letting views on term limits go
on a ballot could set a precedent.
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"Why just this issue?" he said. "Why not
abortion, gun control? Where does the list of
issues end that could be put on a ballot?"
Nixon said he understood the concern
about a precedent.
"There are potential practical problems,
that's why the legislature and the people are
vested with authority on ballot measures like
this," Nixon said.
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court hurt the
term limit movement by ruling that voters in
individual states could not decide whether to
limit terms of the members of Congress.
Only a federal constitutional amendment
could achieve that purpose, it ruled.
As a result, term limit advocates in Missouri
and elsewhere looked for other ways to bring
about term limits, including electing candidates
who favored the limits and would back them in
a federal constitutional amendment.
The decision by the justices Monday is the
second time in recent months that a voter
initiative in Missouri has come before the court.
Earlier this year the court upheld limits
Missouri voters placed on what individuals can
contribute to state legislative candidates.
Copyright C 2000 The Kansas City Star Co.
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Also This Ten:
99-1680 City News and Novelty Inc. v. Waukesha, Wis.
Ruling below (Wis. Ct. App., 231 Wis. 2d 93, 604 N.W.2d 870):
When municipal ordinance involves prior restraint of expressive activity and challenged municipal
action thereunder is ministerial act of assessing business license application in which reviewing
authority does not exercise discretion by passing judgment on content of any protected speech, burden
of proof does not shift to city to defend ordinance's constitutionality; while ordinance in question
appears to contain discrete sections for issuance, revocation, and renewal of licenses for adult
businesses, when read as whole it is clear that standards for issuance of license, which are explicit and
provide narrow, objective, and definite standards for licensing authority, also apply to license renewal,
and thus ordinance does not permit unbridled discretion when considering applications for license
renewal; requirement imposed by FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), that licensor "must
make the decision whether to issue the license within a specified and reasonable time period during
which the status quo is maintained," is satisfied by ordinance's provisions that effectively require
decision on license renewal at least 39 days before license is due to lapse; ordinance's timetable for
challenging licensing decision, which grants aggrieved party 30 days to seek administrative review of
initial decision before municipal authority that made decision, gives that authority 15 days to conduct its
reviews, grants aggrieved party another 30 days to seek appeal of that decision before municipal body,
requires municipality to provide hearing within 15 days of receipt of notice of appeal and to make final
determination within 20 days after hearing, and allows aggrieved party to seek judicial review within 30
days of receipt of municipality's final determination, satisfies constitutional requirement for prompt
access to judicial review.
Question presented: Is licensing scheme that acts as prior restraint required to contain explicit
language that prevents injury to speaker's rights from want of prompt judicial decision?
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